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Equivalence at Law (and Society):
Social Status in Korea, Race in
America
Ilhyung Lee*
ABSTRACT

Professor Lee's Article uses a comparison between the
evolving role of social status in Korean society and that of race
in the United States to explore Korean society and its legal
system. Tracing the historical origins of status consciousness
from the Confucianism of the Chosun dynasty to its vestiges in
contemporary Korean society, Professor Lee notes several
important parallels between social status in Korea and race in
the United States. Emphasizing that there remain significant
differences between the ways each functions in relation to law,
Professor Lee argues that considering the two in equivalence is
nonetheless analytically useful in both framing questions and
proposing solutions. Finally, he points out the advantages to be
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Esq. I also benefited from the comments and suggestions from faculty at presentations
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pronunciation (e.g., Chosun, Hangul, yangban; Chang, Cho, Chun, Chung, Kim, Lee,
Park). Otherwise, English translation of all Korean terms will be in italics, in spelling
that most closely reflects the Korean pronunciation, with a hyphen (-) indicating the
break between individual characters. For example, the Korean for "social status" would
be sah-hwe-juhk shin-boon. Although Korean names have the surname appearing first,
for purposes of consistency in citation and text herein, all names will be in the Western
order, with the first name first, followed by the surname. The second character of the
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letter, unless the name is written differently in readily available English sources. The
spelling of Korean commentators' names who have authored works in English will be
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gained from applying U.S. criticalrace theory methodology in a
Korean social status context.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The subject of law and society in Korea' has received increasing
attention from commentators in recent years. 2 The legal system in

1.
Unless the context indicates otherwise, all references to "Korea" herein are
to the Republic of Korea, popularly known as South Korea. There is the view that there
is only one Korea, but that "[alt present, the land is divided into two parts: the
Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)."
KOREAN OVERSEAS INFORMATION SERVICE, A HANDBOOK OF KOREA 12 (9th ed. 1993).
2.
For years, the leading English texts were PYONG-CHOON HAHM, KOREAN
JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS AND CULTURE (1986), and INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND
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Korea in the opening years of the twenty-first century appears to be
leaving behind nearly three decades of military dictatorships, as well
as thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule, welcoming democracy
(though not yet certain how much), and rapidly transforming itself to
meet the needs of a Korea with international designs. Of course, law
in any national jurisdiction must always be studied in the context of
its culture, and Korean society is one of a long traditional history,
with social norms shaped by over five centuries of the Chosun
dynasty and Confucian ideology. A relatively new constitutional
democracy, the Korean setting provides for a rich discussion of
matters relating to law, politics, society, and culture.
Regarding Korean society, the commentary includes the
observation that Korea, unlike the United States, is a homogeneous
society, 3 free from the matter of race that continues to be a
troublesome issue in U.S. society. 4 Yet observers of Korea urge that
the country is not the homogeneous society that it appears, and that
quite the contrary, there are divisions within society based on a host

LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1983), authored and edited,
respectively, by two eminent Korean legal scholars. More recent texts, reflecting rapid
changes in various areas of Korean law, are available in KOREAN LAW IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1996), and RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN
LAW AND SOCIETY (Dae-Kyu Yoon ed., 2000). In 2001, the Seoul National University
College of Law began publication of the Journal of Korean Law (in English text). On
October 9, 2002, the University of Illinois College of Law hosted what is believed to be
the first conference devoted exclusively to Korean law held at a U.S. law school,
"Korean Legal Reform: Achievements, Problems, and Prospects." There has been a
growing number of articles in U.S. law journals on Korean law written by Korean law
faculty, some of which are referenced herein. In addition, events relating to Korean
business and politics, and the tensions over the nuclear threat on the peninsula have
kept Korea in the news.
3.
Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South
Korea, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 71, 102 (1997) ("Korea has historically been an extremely
mono-cultural state."); Bruce D. Fisher, The Ethical Consumer: A Rejecter of Positive
Law Arbitrage, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 230, 231 n.3 (1994) ("Korea is ethnically
homogeneous."); Dae-Kyu Yoon, New Developments in Korean Constitutionalism:
Changes and Prospects, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 395, 396-97 (1995) ("In homogeneous
societies like Korea, social norms, such as morals, mores, and religion, become more
effective means of social control and integration than law."); see Alex Y. Seita, The
Intractable State of United States-Japan Relations, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 467,
492 n.72 (1995) ("North Korea and South Korea are even more ethnically homogeneous
than Japan: North Korea (99.9% ethnic Korean) and South Korea (99.9% ethnic
Korean)".).
4.
See HANDBOOK OF KOREA, supra note 1, at 14 ("There are no significant
racial minorities in Korea."); see also Ahn, supra note 3, at 102 ("No race or place of
origin issue has ever bothered the Korean judiciary."); Amy L. Chua, Markets,
Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108
YALE L.J. 1, 28 n.134 (1998) ("In . . . Korea, ethnic minorities are not merely
economically disadvantaged, but practically nonexistent"); Fisher, supra note 3, at 231
Korea has little need for equal
n.3 ("[U]nlike the ethnically diverse United States ....
employment opportunity laws based on race or national origin."); James Robinson,
Social Status and Academic Success in South Korea, 38 COMP. EDUC. REV. 506, 509
(1994) ("[R]acial, ethnic, and linguistic difference are absent in South Korea").
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of factors-age, regional origin, class, among others 5-that have
contributed to a deeply hierarchical society. Social status 6 is perhaps
the most impacting and discriminating factor in contemporary
Korean society. Social status shapes the life of every Korean. 7 Status
consciousness in Korea is so pervasive that status differentiation is
frequently included in general discourse about society s and much of
cGntemporary Korean society is seen through the lens of social status.
9
Examples:
*

After Korea's "trial of the century," in which two former presidents
were convicted of a host of charges stemming from a military coup
in 1980 and slush funds amassed while in office, a spokesman of
the then-current administration declared that the convictions
proved "that all men are equal under the law, no matter how high
10
their social status."

*

Politicians, in rhetoric, periodically urge national unity, regardless
11
of social status.

5.
Robert J. Fouser, Cultural Dimensions: The Politics of "Uri", KOREA
HERALD, Aug. 20, 1997, available at 1997 WL 10713197.
For all the talk of cultural unity, Korea is a diverse society... Nearly all the
world's major religions and philosophies claim followers in Korea. Differences
among generations, social classes, and between rural and urban Koreans are
sharp because of the rapid changes in Korean society over the last 30 years.
Id.; John T. Phillips, Editorial, Unproven Superiority, KOREA HERALD, Jan. 20, 1997,
available at 1997 WL 7219378 (letter to editor) ("[Floreigners ... who constantly hear
about the special ethnic unity of Koreans are at the same time puzzled to see the sharp
divisions and the agonistic attitudes between regions (provinces), social classes and
familial backgrounds on this small peninsula.").
6.
Unless the context indicates otherwise, this Article will use "status" as an
abbreviation for "social status."
7.
In conversations in everyday life, different levels of language are used,
depending on the social status of the communicants. See Roger Leverrier, Class
Consciousness and the Korean Mind, 17 KOREA J. 20, 23 (1977); Robert J. Fouser,
Cultural Dimensions: Shifts in Korean Speech Levels, KOREA HERALD, Sept. 24, 1997,
available at 1997 WL 13905177; K. Connie Kang, Greeting Another Language, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at B1.
8.
See Leverrier, supra note 7, at 23.
9.
The rhetoric in some of the following examples could be seen as part of an
emerging societal demand for equality, regardless of social status.
10.
Michael A. Lev, S. Korea Verdicts End an Era, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 1996,
§ 1, at 3 (reporting remarks of Jong Hwan Suh, secretary for policy development).
11.
See Independent Rep. Chung MJ Maintains Independence, WORLD NEWS
CONNECTION, Nov. 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL 30029652 (reporting remarks of
lawmaker and president of Korea Football Association that 2002 World Cup "should
provide momentum for the Korean people to further integrate with one anther so ...
conflicts among social classes can abate"); In-soo Nam, Lee Soo-sung Stresses Honor,
KOREA HERALD, July 9, 1997, available at 1997 WL 10711315 (reporting presidential
candidate's statement that the next president "should remove the differences between
social classes"); South Korea: President Stresses National Unity in Rebuilding Nation,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Feb. 3, 1999, available at 1999 WL 11194710
(reporting president's urging leaders "to usher in an age of harmony and cooperation
among... social classes"); South Korea Tries to Bury JapanAnimosity Ahead of World
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The general standing of women in Korea is often cast in terms of
12
social status.

*

A law professor urges that confrontation between social classes
(among others) has reached "crisis" proportions. 13

Why the obsession with social status? 14 And what are Koreans
and Korea watchers to make of the equal protection provision in the
Korean Constitution that prohibits discrimination based on sah-hwe-

Cup, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Mar. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2351523 (reporting
president's remarks that Korea emerged from Japanese colonial rule when "[a]ll the
people became one regardless of religion, hometown, gender, age, wealth or social
status").
Even North Korea is getting into the act. See North Korea: New Year Message Says
1999 "Turning Point", BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jan. 1, 1999, available at 1999
WL 2216594 (reporting statement by North Korean news agency that reunification
depends on all Koreans uniting "irrespective of difference in ideology, ideal [sic],
religious belief, political view and class and social stratum").
See Min-hee Kim, Korea Suffers Loss of Female Workers Due to Poor
12.
Childcare, KOREA HERALD, Aug. 26, 2000, available at 2000 WL 21234857 ("Despite
the great strides they have made in improving their social status, Korean women still
carry a much greater burden in child rearing and housekeeping duties than their
counterparts in advanced countries, experts say."); Hyun-jin Seo, Korean Women's
Social Standing Remains Low-U.N. Report, KOREA HERALD, July 18, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 19900268 (describing U.N. survey of national gender empowerment
measures: "Despite Korean women's increased participation in social activities over the
last several years their social status has not improved noticeably"); Kyung-hwa Shin,
Web PortalsExpand to Housewives, Feminists, KOREA HERALD, Mar.15, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 8116743 ("While women still have a lower social status than men in Korea,
they now seem to have established themselves in the cyber world."); Report Shows
Textbooks Still Have Bias Against Women, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 18, 1998, available at
1998 WL 7565217 (describing report by women's research institute: "In spite of
remarkable improvement in women's social status over the past 20 years, Korean
textbooks still tend to fill students' heads with traditional concept of gender roles");
Seoul to Host 2004 Global Summit of Women, YONHAP ENG. NEWS, July 3, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 56868547 (reporting plans for "global summit of women ....
[o]fficials said they expect the convention to serve as an opportunity for the world to
see the improved social status of South Korean women"); UN: Committee Told of
Adverse Effects of Economic Crisis on Situation of Women in Republic of Korea, M2
PRESSWIRE, July 8, 1998, available at 1998 WL 14094997 (reporting on report to UN:
"Women's participation in politics must be increased to enhance their social status and
further the country's overall democratic development").
13.
South Korea-Roh Asked To Bring National Unity, Economic Stability,
BERNAMA MALAY. NAT'L NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL
104453308. A dozen years before, a media correspondent had reported that disparity in
classes had become "a social time bomb that threatens the economic and political
progress South Korea has made." Bob Deans, Widening Gap Between Rich, Poor
Threatens South Korean Progress: Despairing Workers Turn to Violent "Self-Defense;"
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, May 14, 1990, at A04.
Why the report in the Korean media of a noted soprano's desire to share
14.
her singing with "ordinary people around the world, regardless of their social status or
wealth?" All Your Answers Lie Inside of You, KOREA TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000, available at
2000 WL 24666118. Or the remarks of a professor and former athlete that "[t]he social
status of the Korean athletes will be elevated in Korea if they win the gold medals"?
Taekwondo Emerges As A Global Village Sport, KOREA TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 24663467.
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juhk shin-boon, or "social status"?1 5 This Article addresses these
questions within an examination of the role of social status in Korean
history and contemporary
society. Given the comparable
characteristics of social status in Korea and race in the United States,
and the parallels between social status and law in the former and
race and law in the latter, this Article advances the question of
whether social status in Korea is the functional equivalent of race in
16
the United States.
Part II introduces status consciousness in Korea and traces the
historical origins of such consciousness from the Chosun dynasty
17
where Confucianism ruled and social status was formal and rigid.
8
Although legal divisions based on status have long been abolished,'
status consciousness is still very much present in contemporary
Korean society. Part III begins with a discussion of the basics of social
status and race, and offers definitions. It then examines whether
social status is to Korea what race has been to the United States, that
is, a means of dividing persons within society, and draws several
parallels between social status and race, especially its respective
relation to law. Part IV addresses the question of whether such
parallels would extend to the application in Korea of something akin
to the critical race theory movement in U.S. legal academia. Such a
critical movement in the Korean setting would challenge the notion of
a formal equality regardless of social status and question whether
Korean law actually provides for equality or, instead, allows and even
fosters inequality based on status distinctions. Although the
discussion concludes that there is ample support for the beginnings of
a Korean "critical status theory," it acknowledges practical concerns
that would make the movement unlikely.
It is acknowledged here that while some will find provocative the
question of the equivalence of race and social status in the respective
societies, others will be more doubtful.' 9 Likewise, applying critical

15.
"All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no
discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on account of sex, religion or
social status." S. KOREA CONST. art. 11(1). The English translation is available on the
Internet site of the Constitutional Court of Korea. Constitution of the Republic of
Korea, available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/english/welcome0l.htm (last visited Nov.
14, 2003).
16.
A text with similar intentions analogizes caste in India to race in America.
See SIDNEY VERBA, BASHIRUDDIN AHMED & ANIL BHATT, CASTE, RACE, AND POLITICS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES (1971).
17.
DENISE POTRZEBA LETT, IN PURSUIT OF STATUS: THE MAKING OF SOUTH
KOREA'S "NEW" URBAN MIDDLE CLASS 14 (1998).
18.
S. KOREA CONST. art. 11(1).

19.
It is fair to say that such mixed reactions are not uncommon in discussions
of matters relating to race and law. There is the reality that in the U.S. setting, race is
a subject that is generally complex, controversial, divisive, and disputed. See Ilhyung
Lee, Race Consciousness and Minority Scholars, 33 CONN. L. REV. 535, 535-36 (2001).
Views regarding the impact of race and race relations in U.S. society are not
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race theory, which criticizes traditional U.S. civil rights law and
20
policy, to a non-U.S. setting, is, to say the least, a novel approach.
This Article, at a minimum, encourages exploration of Korean law
and society, through concepts more familiar to the U.S. setting. The
discussion of equivalence and theory application herein may be all the
more apt in light of the view that Korean law, especially
constitutional law, continues to be influenced by U.S. constitutional
principles. 21 If the development of Korean law at least in small part
depends on the American equivalents, the U.S. approach to matters
of race and civil rights deserve more consideration and scrutiny.

II. SOCIAL

STATUS MATTERS 2 2 (IT'S SOCIAL STATUS, STUPID)

Although every society is conscious of status, status in Korea
takes on a heightened meaning. 23 Anthropologist Denise Lett begins
her ethnographic study of Korea with the observation that "South
Korea is a very status-conscious society" 24 and concludes that the

unanimous, and the suggestion that something that is admittedly not race (i.e., social
status) functions in another society (Korea) like race in the United States is not
commonly seen in the mainstream commentary. The matter of social status in Korea,
or any society, is no simpler; there is "a great deal of controversy that surrounds the
notion of social stratification," BRYAN S. TURNER, STATUS 1 (1988). Nevertheless,
discussion on race in the United States, social status in Korea, the similarities between
the two, and their respective relation to law should begin.
20.
This discussion, to quote the vernacular, "pushes the envelope."
21.
See Ahn, supra note 3, at 73, 115 ("Korea has been under the significant
influence of American constitutionalism since its birth as a republic;" "[tihe influence of
American constitutionalism has been conspicuous in major civil rights law areas since
1988"); Tscholsu Kim & Sang Don Lee, The Influence of U.S. Constitutional Law
Doctrines in Korea, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA
303, 309 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992) ("In the course of transformations of
constitutional democracy and governmental structure of Korea, the influence of
American constitutional law principles has been enormous ....
[C]onstitutional law
doctrines of the United States have consistently exerted influence on the constitutional
development of Korea since 1948."). Indeed, the President of the Constitutional Court
has stated directly that "[m]any decisions of the Korean Constitutional Court have
been influenced by related U.S. decisions." Yong-joon Kim, ConstitutionalAdjudication
System: Experience of Korea, 4 HARV. ASIA Q. 1 (2000), available at
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-asiactr/haq/2O001/00laOO2.htm (speech by President of
Constitutional Court at Harvard Law School, Oct. 4, 1999).
22.
The phrasing is intentional. See generally CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS
(1993).
23.
Or as one commentator observed, "Korean class consciousness surpasses in
thoroughness that of almost any other nation." Leverrier, supra note 7, at 21-22.
24.
LETT, supra note 17, at 1. Lett's text appears to be the most comprehensive
single volume work on social status in contemporary Korean society. Although Lett
intends her study to focus on the Korean middle class, id. at 5, "it must be kept in mind
that many features espoused by the author are, in fact, associated with the 'general'
culture of Koreans, not exclusively with the culture of the 'middle-class."' Doo-Seung
Hong, In Pursuit of Status: The Making of South Korea""New" Urban Middle Class, 28
CONTEMP. SOC. 677, 678 (1999) (reviewing LETT, supra note 17).
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pursuit of status in Korea is so pervasive that it in large part defines
the country. 25 Korea is a society where people have an underlying
drive to attain status 26 and where status consciousness generates an
entire "habitus" or lifestyle. 27 Lett's references to the Korean desire to
seek high status as a "culturally inherited disposition," 28 the deeply
rooted consciousness of social status in Korean society, and the
"ingrained concern with status passed on from generation to
generation" 29 necessarily requires a return to the historical originstraditional Korea during the Chosun dynasty (1392-1910) and the
30
Confucian norms that shaped much of Korean thought.
An integral part of Confucianism 3 1 is that it provides for a
"means of ordering society. '32 Confucianism, or perhaps more aptly
"neo-Confucianism,"33 that is, a brand of Confucianism adapted by
the founders of the Chosun dynasty, "served as a blueprint for
ordering and integrating Korea's political and social life. '34 When this
blueprint was followed closely (at least in the early centuries of the

25.
LETT, supra note 17, at 41, 206. Lett asserts that the societal "desire to
acquire status . . . has been a driving force behind the development of South Korean
human resources." Id. at 41.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 217.
28.
Id. at 2.
29.
Id. at 215.
30.
The Chosun dynasty, sometimes referred to as the Yi dynasty, is frequently
mentioned in historical discussions of Korea. Some Koreans claim their history is one
of at least a few thousand years. See MARK L. CLIFFORD, TROUBLED TIGER:
BUSINESSMEN, BUREAUCRATS, AND GENERALS IN SOUTH KOREA 18 (rev. ed. 1998). The
Shilla (57 B.C.-935 A.D.) and Koryo (918-1392) dynasties preceded the Chosun. For a
history of pre-Chosun Korea, see CARTER J. ECKERT ET AL., KOREA OLD AND NEW: A

HISTORY 1-106 (1990); ANDREW C. NAHM, INTRODUCTION TO KOREAN HISTORY AND
CULTURE 25-98 (1993).

31.
As Professor Chaihark Hahm notes, Confucianism is multi-faceted and may
mean different things to different audiences. Chaihark Hahm, Law, Culture, and the
Politicsof Confucianism, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 253, 268, 276 (2003).
32.
LETT, supra note 17, at 14.
33.
See THE RISE OF NEO-CONFUCIANISM IN KOREA (William Theodore de Bary
& JaHyun Kim Haboush eds., 1983); see also FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, SOUTH KOREA: A COUNTRY STUDY 88-89 (Andrea Matles Savada & William
Shaw eds., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY]; LETT, supra note 17, at 14.
Commentators have noted that Korean Confucianism was even more Confucian than
the original Confucianism. See DONALD STONE MACDONALD, THE KOREANS:
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS AND SOCIETY 32 (1988).
Within one to two centuries, Korea became recognized as a more perfect
Confucian state than China itself. Court records were kept in Chinese; scholars
composed excellent Chinese prose and poetry and were learned in the Chinese
classics. The behavior of even the common people was governed by Confucian
ethics.

Id. ANDREW C. NAHM, KOREA, TRADITION & TRANSFORMATION: A HISTORY OF THE KOREAN
PEOPLE 95 (1988) ("In the end, Korea became more Confucian than Confucian China as its
influence permeated every aspect of the life of the nation.").
34.
LETT, supra note 17, at 13.
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dynasty), the Confucian tradition demanded hierarchy and adherence
to respective roles in all aspects of human relations. 35 Within the
hierarchical society, social status was "rigid and dominant" 36 and
legally defined. Beneath the king and the royal family, Korean society
was formalized and stratified into discrete classes, with the yangban,
representing the ruling class and the societal elite, at the very top,
followed by, in descending order, joong-in (literally, "middle people"),
sang-in (the commoner class), and chun-min (literally, the 'low-born'
or 'inferior people"). 3 7 "Membership in all these status groups was
ascribed by birth rather than acquired by achievement, and the law
as well as social custom guarded against infringement of social
boundaries. '38 Thus, ancestry and birth to a particular class
determined one's social status, role in society, and all aspects of
everyday life.
The yangban held the highest political and social status in
Korean society. 39 The yangban has been described as the Korean
aristocracy, 40 occupying a nobility status. The top officials in
government and military were chosen from this class, 41 and many
were seen as the scholar-official, with the proper moral virtues and

35.
"Acknowledging the authority of the nation and family, and obedience of
the common people to the king, children to parents, wives to husbands, and the young
to the elderly were considered the cardinal rules in maintaining social order." Tae-Rim
Yoon, The Koreans, Their Culture and Personality, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
KOREAN PEOPLE: COLLECTIVISM AND INDIVIDUALISM 18-19 (Gene Yoon & Sang-Chin
Choi eds., 1994); see also COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 33, at 89; DAVID I. STEINBERG,
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 93 (1989).
36.
Yoon, supra note 35, at 19.
37.
The joong-in consisted of central and local functionaries, and medical,
scientific, and foreign language professionals; sang-in composed of "farmers, craftsmen,
fishermen and merchants"; and chun-min included slaves, domestic servants,
sorcerers, butchers, basket-makers, and public entertainers. See NAHM, supra note 30,
at 105-06; NAHM, supra note 33, at 100-01; see also PYONG-CHOON HAHM, THE KOREAN
POLITICAL TRADITION AND LAW 110 n.4 (1967); LETT, supra note 17, at 17-20; PyongChoon Hahm, The Traditional Patterns of Authoritative Symbols and the Judicial
Process in Korea, in HAHM, supra note 2, at 33-42 (adding another class of "outcasts"
below chun-min); Byung Ho Park, Social Castes and Legal Rights Under the Modern
Korean Law, 4 KOREANA Q. 35 (1962).
Hierarchy reigned supreme, as there was hierarchy within almost every class,
including and perhaps especially, the yangban. See ECKERT, supra note 30, at 109 (noting
that within yangban, "[tihe civil order was more prestigious than the military"); GREGORY
HENDERSON, KOREA: THE POLITICS OF THE VORTEXT 37-46 (1968) (chronicling differences
over several centuries); LETTr, supra note 17, at 22 (noting aristocratic factions and
hereditary groupings within yangban class). Within the sang-in class, farmers were
perceived to occupy the highest sub-class, and the merchants the very lowest. Id. at 18.
38.
MARTINA DEUCHLER, THE CONFUCIAN TRANSFORMATION OF KOREA: A
STUDY OF SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGY 13 (1992), quoted in LETT,supra note 17, at 20.
39.
See FUJIYA KAWASHIMA, WHAT IS YANGBAN?: A LEGACY FOR MODERN
KOREA 2 (2002).
40.
See LETT, supranote 17, at 16; MACDONALD, supra note 33, at 35.
41.
See ECKERT, supra note 30, at 108; HAHM, supra note 37, at 110 n.4; NAHM,
supra note 30, at 105-06.
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superior ethics to rule and govern. 42 Initially, yangban status was
achieved by competitive civil service exams, which required mastery
of philosophy and ethics in Chinese; 43 thus, education afforded
opportunities for social mobility. Eventually, however, "members of
established ruling elite had effectively placed a hereditary
requirement on future exam takers," and only descendants of a
former successful candidate were eligible for the exams. 44 Thus,
membership in yangban as well as the other classes was determined
'46
by ancestry 4 5 in a "strict hereditary class structure.
Despite the multiple classes in Korean society during the Chosun
era, commentators have noted the essentially dichotomous nature of
society--one was either yangban or non-yangban.47 Or as Lett
explains, "the major dividing line in Chos6n society was the
distinction between the 'noble' . . . and the 'base' . . . or the
honored ... and the despised .. 48, the pure and the impure,49 the
upper class and the lower class.
The upper orders were born to rule, to practice virtue, and to cultivate
enlightenment and learning. The lower orders were born to obey and to
serve; they were inherently ineducable and incapable of understanding
the Confucian ethic. The upper classes were not only richer, more
50
respectworthy, and better educated, but they were more virtuous.

42.

The sole duty of the yangban was to devote themselves exclusively to the
study and self-cultivation that Confucian doctrine holds must underlie
the governing of others, and their sole profession was the holding public
office...

Their role . . . was to fashion an ideal Confucian polity through

moral cultivation of Chos6n's people.
ECKERT, supra note 30, at 108-09. See Yoon, supra note 35, at 20 (describing "ideal
picture of an official's life: ... being absorbed in reading, carrying a humble life while
receiving a governmental stipend, composing poetry and memorizing ancient sages,
being attentive to moral ethics, and being erudite").
43.
LETT, supra note 17, at 14-15.
44.
Id. at 15-16. See ECKERT, supra note 30, at 114; HENDERSON, supra note 37,
at 37.
45.
LETr, supra note 17, at 207 ("During the Chos6n dynasty, ancestry became
the main basis of asserting high or yangban status.").
46.
Id. at 14. See BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA'S PLACE IN THE SUN: A MODERN
HISTORY 51 (1997); Seung-Jong Ji, Chosun juhn-gi-eui ju-jong-gwan-geh-wa sah-nohbi-eui sung-gyuk [Master-Slave Relationships and the Characterof Private Slaves in
Early Chosun Times], in HAN-GUK-EUI SAH-HWE-SHIN-BOON-GWA SAH-HWE-GEH-CHEUNG
[SOCIAL STATUS AND SOCIAL HIERARCHY OF KOREA] 33-36 (1986); MACDONALD, supra
note 33, at 35.
47.
LETT,supra note 17, at 16.
48.
Id. at 20; see also id. at 21; CUMINGS, supra note 46, at 56.
49.
LETT,supra note 17, at 20; see CUMINGS, supra note 46, at 56.
50.
Herbert Passin, Untouchabilityin the FarEast, 11 MONUMENTA NIPPONICA
247, 257 (1955), quoted in LETT, supra note 17, at 20-21. Professor Cumings echoes the
point: "The purified social order was in which yangban were pure and everyone else
was not. The pure at the top, having perfected the social order, and all others ought to
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"Everything distinguished the yangban from the commoner, including
the size of one's home, the educational opportunities of one's children,
dress and the manner of address, even body language, one's
52
carriage." 51 Some of the restrictions were mandated by law.
Enjoying the privilege and benefits of their status, the yangban "could
not be other than elitist. They pursued various strategies to protect
their status and limit their numbers. Yangban married only among
themselves, thus preserving the hereditary nature of yangban
status."53 They would not engage in clerical tasks or manual labor,
"and even refused to have non-yangban families as their neighbors. '54
It should be noted that the social status system described above
lost much of its rigid and strict character long before the Chosun
dynasty came to an end in 1910. 55 Korea expert Gregory Henderson
notes that the four-class description "is the official one of the
dynasty,"56 but that, especially in the latter centuries, class
distinctions were not as sharp or rigid as presumed. 57 Moreover,
other authors confirm that the formal class system was legally
abolished and the yangban-dominated status structure eliminated
during the Chosun dynasty itself, in the "sweeping' and "momentous"
social reforms of 1894, nearly two decades before Japanese colonial
58
rule began.
Although these points are of some historical interest, more
relevant to the discussion herein is to what extent the Confucian
norms, especially those of order and hierarchy, are present in
contemporary Korean society. The views are somewhat scattered.
Korea specialist William Shaw challenges the "notion of static,
timeless characteristics" of a "Korean social order" and questions the

know their place, and the difference between noble and base." CUMINGS, supra note 46,
at 56.
51.

CUMINGS, supra note 46, at 56.

52.
For example, the type of hanbok (traditional Korean attire) one could wear
or the type of home one could occupy depended on one's class standing. See The History
of Seoul Metropolitan, available at http://seoul600.visitseoul.net/seoul-history/minsok
txt/text/3-3-11.html.
53.

ECKERT, supra note 30, at 109.

54.
NAHM, supra note 30, at 106.
55
HENDERSON, supra, note 37, at 42.
56.
Id. at 37 ("Scholars have followed this description with more or less minor
deviations."). Indeed, many have. See supra note 37 for examples.
57.
Henderson argues that there was a "high degree of unacknowledged
flexibility in the middle levels," and that social mobility explains the increase in the
yangban population. Id. at 42. Relying on the work of Shikata Hiroshi, an expert on
oriental population statistics, Henderson concludes that the yangban comprised 7.4
percent of the population in 1690, but increased to 48.6 percent in 1858. Id. at 41; see
also Hahm, supra note 37, at 33 n.8. Henderson explains that "[o]nly the upper
yangban maintained really strict status, and only the hopelessly poor cleaved strictly to
low status." HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 42.
58.

ECKERT, KOREA OLD AND NEW, supra note 30, at 227.
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lasting effects of Confucianism on Korean law. 59 Yet another
commentator notes that "Confucian culture [still] provides the tools
with which Koreans interpret and give order to the world around
them." 60 Even Shaw acknowledges "the residual strength" of
Confucianism in "interpersonal relations; '61 such relations are a
constant in the development of every society. Korea observers
indicate that the residue has proved quite potent, 62 and that the
continuing influence of Confucianism on contemporary Korea is
palpable.6 3 Despite critical commentary of Confucianism seen in more
recent years, 64 many of the Confucian norms prevalent in Chosun

59.

William Shaw, Rights, Culture, and Policy: The Prevailing Model, in

HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA: HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 (William Shaw

ed., 1991). Shaw relies on developments on the peninsula beginning from end of the
nineteenth century: the decline of Confucianism as a "living political philosophy ...
that began in the 1880s and sharply accelerated after the loss of Korean independence
in 1910"; the growth during the same period of "alternative philosophical, religious, or
political traditions and forms of organization, including ... Christianity [and] Western
liberalism"; the "militarized government and social control" by the Japanese from 1910
to 1945; and the "large, often politically significant military establishment[]" since
1945. Id.
Regarding the effect of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) on the traditional class
structure, Lett asserts that "[tihere is no major 'leap' between yangban society and
contemporary South Korean middle-class society, even with the intrusion of the
Japanese colonization." LETT, supra note 17, at 226. Another author acknowledges
possibility of the elimination of such Korean traditions, but adds: "[I]t may also be
argued that the Japanese system reinforced more abstracted concepts of hierarchy and
allowed at least some of the yangban to retain their traditional roles vis-a-vis other
Koreans, if not the Japanese themselves." STEINBERG, supra note 35, at 94.
60.
Hahm, supra note 31, at 257; see also id. at 271-72 ("[Clonfucianism
provides the people with the signs, symbols, and strategies-the tools with which to
negotiate the world around them.").
61.
Shaw, supra note 59, at 4.
62.
CLIFFORD, supra note 30, at 10 ("The glue for this system comes in the form
of a rigid hierarchy, a residue of Confucianism .... "); Sang-Hun Choe, South Korean
Draft Dodgers Are Marked Men, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2003, § 1, at 5 (referring to
Confucianism as "the centuries-old primer on social behavior").
63.
One way to explain the influence of Confucianism on contemporary Korea
is that Korean society appears to be one that "values tradition and continuity with the
past," and is still connected to "a nostalgic past to which everything attempted in the
present must appeal." Ilhyung Lee, Culturally-Based Copyright Systems?: The U.S. and
Korea in Conflict, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1103, 1155 (2001) (citing FONS TROMPENAARS &
CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER, RIDING THE WAVES OF CULTURE: UNDERSTANDING
CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL BUSINESS 126 (2d ed. 1998)). "In contrast, the United

States is oriented more to the present and future." Id. at 1155. This would explain why
even with the demise of the Chosun dynasty, "its long rule of 518 years had left a deep
impression upon national attitudes and behavior that is still important." MACDONALD,
supra note 33, at 35.
64.
Confucianism has been the target of blame for some of Korea's societal woes
and ills, including, the loss of Korean sovereignty to Japanese colonial powers, crony
capitalism, corruption, and authoritarianism. See Hahm, Law, Culture, and the Politics
of Confucianism, supra note 31, at 266. Confucianism is also frequently blamed for the
unequal status of women in Korea. See generally Erin Cho, Caught in Confucius'
Shadow: The Struggle for Women's Legal Equality in South Korea, 12 COLUM. J. ASIAN
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dynasty are stitched tightly into the Korean social fabric. 65 Thus,
although class and social status are no longer legally defined,
contemporary Korean society continues to be deeply, perhaps rigidly,
hierarchical. 66 In interpersonal relations within the family, in school,
in the workplace, and in virtually any setting involving interaction
with those other than mere passersby, Koreans have a keen
awareness of their status relative to that of others. 6 7 In short, in the
Korea of today, those with high status seek to maintain their status,
and those with lower status seek to enhance their lot,6 8 both with the
passion, vigor, and occasional excess for which much of Korean
society has become famous. 69 Social status matters, and matters a
great deal. It may matter even more than individual merit and
ability. 70 To put it mildly, "status is the key to everything" in Korea

L. 125 (1998). Cho also notes President Chung-Hee Park's condemnation of
"Confucianism's influence in the economic realm for encouraging a mentality of
vassalage, lack of independent spirit, indolence, lack of enterprise, malicious
selfishness and lack of sense of honor in the Korean people." Id. at 152 (citing CHUNGHEE PARK, OUR NATION'S PATH: IDEOLOGY OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 34-107 (1962)).

65.
This is not to suggest that traditional cultural norms can explain
everything in the Korea of the present. There is danger in relying on culture globally to
explain, for example, the alleged piracy of U.S. intellectual property products in Korea.
See Lee, supra note 63, at 1129. "When traditional culture meets the industrial age, it
is not clear when culture applies and when it does not. Some cultural forces become
more dominant than others, and the meeting of culture and modernization unearths
inconsistencies and questions." Id.
66.
This statement has support from observers of Korea from a variety of
disciplines. E.g., CLIFFORD, supra note 30, at 10.
Every aspect of Korean society is rigidly organized according to title, which
often reflects seniority. Behavior toward seniors is extremely deferential, and
requires special forms of speech, while that toward juniors can often be rough
and crude. Even among twins, the younger one typically defers to the older one
and uses an honorific form of speech.
Id. Yoon, supra note 35, at 18 ("Korean society is vertical; hierarchy is very strong.").
67.
See MACDONALD, supra note 33, at 80 ("In interpersonal relations, age and
relative status still carry some of their traditional importance: The junior owes respect
to the senior, and the senior carries the obligation to look out for the junior."); Yoon,
supra note 35, at 18 ("Children must obey parents, teachers, and elders.").
68.
Beginning in the 1960s, "[t]hose with yangban ancestry sought to regain
their previous status; those with commoner backgrounds sought to acquire status."
LETT, supra note 17, at 206 (citing KWANG-OK KIM, SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THE RESURGENCE OF ANCESTOR WORSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA 197

(1992)).

"Rather than striving for yangban status, modern day Koreans strive for middle-class
status." Id. at 32. Lett argues that the dichotomous nature of Chosun society is also
seen in the contemporary setting, "between those preoccupied with status, including
members of the so-called middle class, and those too poor to assert status." Id. at 207.
69.
Mark Clifford refers to the "culture of rage" that is seen in various sectors
of Korean life-politics, business, labor, education, religion. CLIFFORD, supra note 30,
at 11-14.
70.
See Chan Jin Kim, Korean Attitudes Towards Law, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y
J. 1, 18-19 (2000); Sungeun Yang & Paul C. Rosenblatt, Shame in Korean Families, 32
J. COMP. FAMILY STUD. 361, 365 (2001).
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"and is sought by all. '71
For the more accommodating reader, the above discussion will
indicate similarities between social status in Korea and race in the
United States. The dichotomous yangban and non-yangban
distinction in traditional Korea draws the easy parallel of blacks and
whites in the early United States; in both settings, birth determined
membership, and there was formal, legal recognition and separation
of the classes and races, which were eventually abolished 72 ; the still
prevalent consciousness of status in contemporary Korea reminds of
race consciousness stateside. For the less convinced, the following
section delves into the question of this equivalence in more detail,
beginning with the task of definition. What exactly is race (in the
United States)? What does social status mean (in Korea)?

III.

OF EQUIVALENCE AND PARALLELS

A. ras
Defining race is a difficult task 73 and is perhaps best described

71.
MICHAEL BREEN, THE KOREANS 10 (1998).
72.
Id. at 87-88.
73.
The task of definition can sometimes be an exercise in despair, as seen in
the following exchange at oral argument in a case involving a school district's alleged
system of racial classifications and quotas.
THE COURT:

Will you
means?

COUNSEL:

I wish I knew.

THE COURT:

All right. Thank you.

COUNSEL:

I wish I knew what the plaintiffs
said it means.

THE COURT:

Are you conceding that for the
purposes of your client that they
do not know what race means?

COUNSEL:

I'm saying I don't know what
race means.

THE COURT:

You're representing the school

tell

me

what race

district [the defendant].
COUNSEL:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Does the school district know
what race means?

COUNSEL:

I don't believe they do. I don't
believe that they know more
than I do.
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as a continuing work in progress. 74 Race is multi-faceted, as the
dictionaries and commentary indicate.7 5 There is the sharply
criticized biological approach to race, which portrays race in terms of
genotype, phenotype, and morphology. 76 This has given way to the
view that race is socially constructed, 77 "the idea that tace evolves as
a function of historical, social, political, and economic contexts. 7 8 The
diverse approaches to the matter of race also include K. Anthony
Appiah's oft-quoted view that there is no such thing as race, 7 9 that

Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 861 (9th Cir. 1998).
74.
A recent text that surveys the varied history is Daniel J. Sharfstein, The
Secret History of Race in the United States, 112 YALE L.J. 1473 (2003). See also
Nicholas D. Kristof, Editorial, Is Race Real?, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2003, at 19.
75.
See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1870 (1993) (providing multiple definitions and synonyms);
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-5
(1991) (stating that race covers "four distinct ideas: status-race, formal-race, historicalrace, and culture-race").
Or is race in the eye of the beholder, a matter of choice? See Christine B. Hickman,
The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,African Americans, and the U.S.
Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1244-54, 1262 (1997). The question received attention
in the commentary relating to census forms in recent decades that allow individuals to
self-identify their own race, in contrast to previous settings, where a census
enumerator would make the racial determination. See Tanya Kater! Hernindez,
MultiracialMatrix: The Role of Race Ideology in the Enforcement of Antidiscrimination
Laws, A United States-Latin Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1105, 1111 &
n.105 (2002).
76.
See WILLIAM W. HOWELLS, THE MEANING OF RACE IN THE BIOLOGICAL AND
SOCIAL MEANING OF RACE 16 (Richard H. Osborne ed., 1971) ("Races... are not, and
never were, groups clearly defined biologically. The gene flow between human
populations makes race boundaries always more or less blurred."); Kristof, supra note
74, at 19 (quoting Bryan Sykes, Oxford geneticist and author ("There's no genetic basis
for any kind of rigid ethnic or racial classification at all"), and The New England
Journal of Medicine ("race is biologically meaningless")); see also Ho v. San Francisco
Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Race got its standing in the
nineteenth century by pseudo-science.").
77.
The commentary that espouses race as a social construct is considerable
and growing. A leading work is Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race:
Some Observationson Illusion, Fabrication,and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1994). See also MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 54-55 (2d ed. 1994). The idea of race as a social
construct has received agreement from one district court. Cotter v. City of Boston, 73 F.
Supp. 2d 62, 63 n.1 (D. Mass. 1999) (citing States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (D.
Mass. 1998)) ("[Ilt is blind ignorance to declaim that the concept of 'race' is nothing
more than a social construct.").
78.
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of CriticalRace
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1759 (2002) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002)).
79.
"The truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can
do all we ask 'race' to do for us." Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois
and the Illusion of Race, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21, 35-36 (Henry Louis
Gates, Jr. ed., 1985); ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE 45 (1992).
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the discussion should rather be in terms of "culture. 80° The U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged many of the multiple approaches to
race (except for that of Appiah) when it was faced with the task of
defining race for the purpose of an actionable racial discrimination
claim under Section 1981.81 The Court noted that the meaning of
race changes over time, referring to no less than eleven dictionaries
and encyclopedias, some from the early nineteenth century.8 2 The
Court's following statement provides a convenient summary of the
multi-faceted approach to race:
There is a common popular understanding that there are three major
human races-Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid. Many modern
biologists and anthropologists, however, criticize racial classifications
as arbitrary and of little use in understanding the variability of human
beings. It is said that genetically homogeneous populations do not exist
and traits are not discontinuous between populations; therefore, a
population can only be described in terms of relative frequencies of
various traits. Clear-cut categories do not exist. The particular traits
which have generally been chosen to characterize races have been
criticized as having little biological significance .... [Slome, but not all,
scientists to conclude that racial classifications are for the most part
83
sociopolitical,rather than biological, in nature.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that for purposes of Section 1981,
race refers to "ancestry or ethnic characteristics," and that
discrimination based on such classifications is prohibited, "whether or
not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific
theory. '8 4 Thus, despite the considerable literature criticizing race as

80.
Appiah, Uncompleted Argument, supra note 79, at 36. But then what is
"culture"? Culture is:
"a fundamental feature of human consciousness, the sine qua non of being
human"; culture is our "social legacy"; culture may take over the world. Culture
has also been described as "one of the two or three most complicated words in
the English language." There is no shortage of proposed definitions-according
to one study. The definition of culture remains elusive and contested. The
various definitions exist in part because the term is used by experts in a
number of different social fields. A substantial bibliography now exists on the
search for a definition of culture (and perhaps a separate but related
bibliography of works commenting on such search).
Lee, supra note 63, at 1109-10 (footnotes and citations omitted).
81.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). The case is Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604 (1987). The specific issue in the case was whether the plaintiff of Arabian
ancestry was protected from racial discrimination under Section 1981, which does not
refer to "race," but which the Court has construed to forbid racial discrimination. Id. at
609-10. The defendant had argued that since the plaintiff was of Arabian descent and
therefore a member of the Caucasian race, racial discrimination was not at work, since
the statute "does not encompass claims of discrimination by one Caucasian against
another." Id.
82.
Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 610.
83.
Id. at 610 n.4 (emphasis added) (extensive citations omitted).
84.
Id. at 604.
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a biological determination, the Court's approach indicates that the
8 5
U.S. legal definition of race has a significant biological attachment.
Ancestry, by definition, refers to that passed on biologically, and
although ethnicity is more susceptible to social construction, it can
also be biologically transmitted. Race is thus thought to be inherited
and fixed at birth.8 6 And classifications made on such ground to
determine "state-sanctioned benefits and burdens" are precisely 8the
7
type of division that the Constitution does not and cannot endorse.
B. sah-hwe-juhk shin-boon
In the social sciences, the subject of social status (and the
related, and sometimes interchangeably used, "class"8 8 ) appears to
receive the most consideration by those in the field of sociology. A
Western commentator notes that "the very concept of status is
vague,"8 9 but in an effort to begin the discourse, informs that
"[w]ithin sociology, the notion of social status is often connected with
the concept of social role. A role is a set of expectations which define
the position of a person in society." 90 Differences of such social roles
and the resulting social inequality are inevitable in every society that
has reached a certain population size and development. 91 Yet studies
delineating status stratification or differentiation often entail
controversy, for one reason or another. 92 Regarding Korean society
specifically, sociologists have attempted to determine class groups
employing a variety of empirical methods and relying on economic

See Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145, 160 (1994) ('The popular
85.
concept of race persists in treating human ethnic difference as the product of a rigid,
static biological mechanism."); Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 11 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 222, 225 (1996) (reviewing JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK

WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, COMMUNITY (1995)) ("Both ancestry and color assume that race is
a biological quality."); Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the
Institution of Property, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 309, 328 (1996) ("Under racial ideology in the
United States, race is inherited biological status.").
86.
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (noting that race and
national origin are "determined solely by the accident of birth"); see also Gloria
Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as' Race and Ethnicity, 19
CHIcANO-LATINO L. REV. 69, 131 (1998) ("The idea that race is fixed and inherited
remains widely accepted and reflected in the law.").
87.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(citing Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978)).
"Status" generally refers to "a position in society," whereas "class" tends to
88.
emphasize the Marxian concept of differentiation based on economic interests. See
TURNER, supra note 19, at 1-2.
Id. at 1.
89.
90.
Id. at 3. "Roles may be defined as 'the bundles of socially-defined attributes
and expectation associated with social positions."' Id. (quoting NICHOLAS ABERCROMBIE
ET AL., THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 180 (1984)).

See Chae-Yun Kim, Social Strata, in KOREAN SOCIETY 57, 57 (Shin-Yong
91.
Chun ed., 1982).
92.
See TURNER, supra note 19, at 1.
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and other factors. 93 These works are informative. A full appreciation
of status consciousness in contemporary Korean society should also
include any popular or social construction of social status; and
understanding legal measures that prohibit discrimination based on
social status requires an articulable legal definition of the term.
These points are addressed in turn.
What does "social status" mean in Korea? The instructive portion
of the Korean phrasing is the last two characters, shin-boon, which
one Korean-English dictionary defines as "one's social position," "one's
station in life," "one's position in society," "identity. '94 The leading
Korean dictionaries must also be consulted. A 1957 edition offers only
tautological descriptions ("individual's social status"; "individual's
legal status"); 95 a 1974 text repeats these descriptions and adds a
third, which refers to caste distinctions in feudal and medieval
societies. 9 6 A more recent reference defines shin-boon as "(1) status
that a person enjoys in society . . . (2) qualification or function of a

person as a member of society or corporation or such group of
people ... (3) social caste ranking from the privileged to the
underprivileged in feudal age . . . ,,97 A review of the references thus
indicates that the term "social status" in Korea, at least in part,
refers to one's identity, qualification, and function. 98
Like the definition of race in the United States, the meaning of
social status in Korea has also received attention from the respective

93.
See Doo-Seung Hong, Occupation and Class: An Exploration of Class
Classificationby Cluster Analysis, 16 KOREAN SOC. Sci. J. 7, 9-11 (1990) (summarizing
methods of classification of Korean society by four independent studies). Hong
advances class delineation based on occupation, as it is "the empirical variable which
best represents class characteristics," but also acknowledges that "it is controversial to
determine what specific aspect of occupational attributes offers most properly an
account of similarities or dissimilarities between classes." Id. at 11; see also Hagen Koo
& Doo-Seung Hong, Class and Income Inequality in Korea, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 610 (1980)
(advancing premise that "classes designate structural positions in the social division of
labor" and identifying five major class categories: "the capitalist class"; "the new middle
class"; "the working class"; "the petite bourgeoisie"; and "the marginal class").
94.
MINJUNG ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1257 (2d ed. 1993)
(emphases added).
95.
HANGUL ACADEMY, KEUN-SAH-JUHN [THE GREAT KOREAN DICTIONARY]
1935 (1957).
96.

SEH O0-RI-MAHL KEUN-SAH-JUHN [THE NEW KOREAN GREAT DICTIONARY]

2094 (1974).
97.
YONSEi KOREAN DICTIONARY, available at http://clid.yonsei.ac.kr:8000/dic/
default.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2003) (emphasis added).
98.
In contrast, based on the etymological origins of "social" and "status," the
English "social status" refers generally to the condition, position, or standing of a
companion. See THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 1029, 1062 (1988); ERIC
PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH 637,
665, 662 (1958). See also TURNER, supra note 19, at 2 ("In its everyday usage, the
notion of status is derived from the Latin for 'standing' and relates simply to one's
position in society.").
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locale. 99 Perhaps social status (like race) can be viewed as a social
construct, 0 0 one that "evolves as a function of historical, social,
political, and economic contexts."'1 1 Reference to these contexts in the
Korean setting unavoidably leads to a key common denominator:
deeply rooted Confucian norms, which shaped Korean social history,
and which arguably have significant impact on contemporary society,
politics, and business. 10 2 Consideration of the Korean experiencetaken as a whole-indicates that three factors determine the
construct of social status in contemporary society: education; family;
and wealth.' 0 3 Of the three, education and family are the two most
direct remnants of status in the Chosun dynasty; wealth as a
determinant of social status is more likely a result of democratization,
capitalism, and economic progress. The determinant of family is also
closely related to education and wealth. Each determinant is
addressed in turn.

99.
100.

See infra note 168.
See LETT, supra note 17, at 225.

Status consciousness is embodied in a need for status and a disposition toward
pursuing status. Status consciousness is imposed and internalized by class
conditions or by conditions of existence. Part of class conditioning is socially
constituted. The need for status, as are all cultural needs, is a product of
upbringing and education.
Id. (emphasis added).
101.
Carbado & Gulati, supra note 78, at 1759.
102.
Yoon, supra note 3, at 398 (discussing connection between Confucianism
and economic development in Korea); Amy Choe, Note and Comment, Korea's Road
Toward Respecting Intellectual Property Rights, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
341, 364 (1999) (noting that "despite the shift towards democratic rule, [Confucian]
authoritarianism continues to play a major role in Korean politics"); Rosa Kim, Note,
The Legacy of Institutionalized Gender Inequality in South Korea; The Family Law, 14
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 145 (1994) (noting political influence of Confucian activists, and
societal respect for Confucian heritage). But see Shaw, supra note 59, at 4 (arguing
"decline of Confucianism as a living political philosophy").
103.
The discourse on social status has also included age, regional origin, and
marital status as factors in determining social status. See LETT, supra note 17, at 48-49
(discussing favoritism based on region of origin in employment); Jeong-Yoo Kim &
Hyunju Kim, Stigma in Divorces and Its Deterrence Effect, 31 J. SOcIO-ECONOMICS 1
(2002), available at 2002 WL 101782880 ("Social status of being married has several
advantages, such as being free from pressures for marriage, and gaining an adult
status in the family as well as in the society, and also having financial benefits in
taxation as well as in salaries."); Kelley Bouchard, Diversity Expert Takes up Challenge
in Lewiston, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 8, 2002, at 1A, available at 2002 WL
23935366 (reporting experiences of American (and daughter of Slovak immigrants) in
Korea, who was regularly asked questions "that reflected [a] fascination with religion
and social status: Are you Christian? Are you married? How old are you?").
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04
1. Education (hahk-buhl)1

Education is the single most important determinant of social
status in contemporary Korea.10 5 Stated simply, the purpose of
education is to seek or maintain status. 10 6 This is a modern day
continuation of the role of education in the Chosun years: 0 7 "Just as
education was equated with moral worth and conferred prestige in and
of itself in the Confucian world order of past days, education today is
being sought for its own sake or, rather, for the prestige it confers."' 0 8
The presumption that inherent in education is character, culture, and
proper behavior continues today. 10 9 Given the great importance of

104.
Hahk-buhl is defined as "an academic clique; academical [sic]
sectarianism." MINJUNG ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 94, at
2277. Less formalistically but more practically and commonly, one's hahk-buhl refers to
his educational background.
105.
COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 33, at 98 ("Education remained the single
most important factor affecting social mobility in the 1990s."); LETT, supra note 17, at
159 ("A college or university education has become one of the most important markers
of middle-class status in South Korea"); id. at 164 ("[A]cquisition of a university degree
was the surest way ... to acquire status."); see also VINCENT S.R. BRANDT, A KOREAN
VILLAGE: BETWEEN FARM AND SEA 95 (1971) ("Education is an important formal
determinant of social status today."); Robinson, supra note 4, at 512 ("Education has
always played a gatekeeping role in the maintenance of higher social status.").
106.
The Korean pursuit of education is "more than anything else a pursuit of
status." LETT, supra note 17, at 159. Lett states that status, not job prospects, is the
primary motive for seeking higher education. Id. at 164. Professor Won-Shik Chong
refers to "a status-oriented education" in Korea, and notes the societal confirmation of
the "idea of going to ... college to secure a certain status." Won-Shik Chong, Zeal for
Education, 26 KOREA J. 45, 50 (1986); see also Michael Baker, Rooting the Rote Out of
Learning: S. Korea Wants Creativity in Its Education System, Not Uniform Ways of
Thinking, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 6, 1996, at 1 (reporting remarks of Korean
research fellow that Korean parents are interested in "the name value of the
universities, not the quality of the education, and just regard education as a path to
social success and status").
107.
See COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 33, at 98 ("The social importance of
education is one of the major continuities between traditional and contemporary
Korea."); see also Robinson, supra note 4, at 512-13 (stating that in Chosun times,
"young man's ability to pass [the civil service] examinations validated a family's social
status, and the sons of yangban generally followed their ancestors in passing the
exams. After 1945, the remaining traces of this Confucian educational order have
remained prominent"). Lett explains the continuation of the Chosun norm and the
modern variations:
During the Choson dynasty, mastery of Chinese and the Confucian classics and
passing the civil service exams and thereby earning a degree conferred high
status. Now, it is the mastery of English and passing the university entrance
exam in order to acquire a university degree that are marks of culture and high
status.
LETT, supra note 17, at 210.
108.
LETT, supra note 17, at 211.
109.
Id. at 159, 161. "In the 1990s education, moral worth, and status were still
linked in the minds of Koreans." Id. at 160.
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education-or more specifically, the undergraduate college to which
one wins admission-preparation for the all-or-nothing college
entrance exams begins at a very young age. 110 The great cost that
parents expend in preparing their children, the pressure they put on
them to succeed academically, and the brutal years in the young life of
the Korean student in preparation for college admissions are all
legendary. 111 It is not uncommon for students, especially those in
secondary schools, to be attending exam preparation schools, or
receiving other private instruction into the evening hours, long after
their regular school day is complete. 112 Given the rigorous schedule,
or
the frequently seen Korean term for the process, si-hum ji-ohk,
"examination hell," does not seem too much of an exaggeration. 113
114

2. Family (gah-moon)

The family is basic to the life of every Korean. 115 Lett notes that
"one's class status is so very much a function of one's family status"116

110.
"Korea ... is a republic of entrance exams." Wan-jung Joo, The Republic of
Exams, CHOSUN ILBO, Dec. 1, 2003, available at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/
htmllnews/200312/200312010030.html. There is an accepted and well known hierarchy
of colleges in the country. See COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 33, at 98; Jeffrey Goldberg,
The Overachievers, NEW YORK, Apr. 10, 1995, at 46. Perhaps Korean colleges mirror
the hierarchical society to which they send graduates.
111.
See Chong, supra note 106, at 50 ("The education fever found these days in
Korea can be hardly said to be that of the student but rather that of the parents");
Eunjung Kim, The Relationship Between Parental Involvement and Children's
EducationalAchievement in the Korean Immigrant Family, J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 529
(Oct. 1, 2002), available at 2002 WL 20556573 ("[Plarents rarely leave educational
success to chance; they generally subject their children to intense parental pressure to
study hard and to succeed in the educational system.").
See Meery Lee & Reed Larson, The Korean "ExaminationHell" Long Hours
112.
of Studying, Distress, and Depression, 29 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 2, available at
2000 WL 22038785 (reporting survey of high school seniors in Korea and the United
States).
Korean adolescents were found to spend much more time in schoolwork and
less time in discretionary activities than their American counterparts. Korean
adolescents' affect states across daily activities were more negative relative to
American adolescents... These findings suggest that the effect of the college
exam in generating depression in Korean adolescents may be partly mediated
through its effect on their daily experience.
Id.
113.
There is a cost, on Korean youth, and ultimately, Korean society. Id.; see
also JEONG-KYU LEE, KOREAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A CONFUCIAN PERSPECTIVE 173- 86
(2002); COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 33, at 115-16.
114.
Gah-moon means "one's family [clan]; pedigree." MINJUNG ESSENCE
KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 94, at 27. To inquire of gah-moon is to seek
information about family background, that is, parents, their identity, position,
standing, education and wealth.
MACDONALD, supra note 33, at 69.
115.
116.

LETT, supra note 17, at 228.
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and that "status and ... status assertion are a family, rather than an
individual, affair." 117 Thus, one's status at birth depends in part on
the parents' education and wealth. 118 The family's status can be
enhanced by the children's education. 119 There is the following rather
blunt assessment of how impacting and lasting the social status of a
family can be in the Korean psyche:
A Korean filling out an application for a job or school admission will
have to answer questions concerning family status. He or she will have
to list family members, their gender, age, and occupation, what region
of the country they are from (or where the applicant's father or his
family is from), whether parents are alive, and sometimes the highest
level of education achieved by each family member. A failing of any
family member may weaken an applicant's chances. For example,
Koreans . . . [whose family past] includes a low status job or
poverty... want to hide that. Koreans tend to see past or present
lower status as a predictor of bad things. . . . [W]ith lower status a
predictor of bad things, for a father to lose his job or to have a lower
status job is to create problems for his children in their finding good
jobs, good marriages, and other kinds of success. Thus, in Korea there
is not the sense that each person should be considered on her or his own
merits. Individual shame can do damage to the status of other family
members.

120

Family identity as a determinant of social status is also a
continuation of the rules of the Chosun dynasty, since ancestry
determined membership in the discrete classes. 121 Modified in the
contemporary setting, it is not patrileneage but the immediate family
that shapes status. 122 Thus, the marriage of children, much like their
education, is seen as an activity affecting the family as a whole.
Indeed, marriage is generally regarded as a union of two families
rather than two individuals, 123 and is a vehicle to assert, maintain,

117.
Id. at 212.
118.
An example of anecdotal evidence is the reported experiences of a Korean
American interviewing for jobs in Korea, who indicated that employers asked, "Where
did your father go to school?" Migrant Survives Pollution and Korean Cultural Shock,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 19, 1996, at 7, available at 1996 WL 3758115
(emphasis added).
119.
"[M]any families have used education as a means of social mobility." LETT,
supra note 17, at 210; see id. at 160 ("[Because education was so important to the
status of the family.., it is and always has been the family rather than the
government that has carried the primary financial burden for the education of their
young."). This would explain the great pressure parents put on their children to
succeed academically. See supra text accompanying note 111.
Yang & Rosenblatt, supra note 70, at 365.
120.
121.
See supra text accompanying note 38.
122.
LETT, supranote 17, at 40-41.
123.
See Reuter, Brides School Eases Transition of S. Korean Women Wed to
GIs, RocKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 26, 1995, at 77A, available at 1995 WL 3172783 (quoting
program director of "brides school" for Korean wives and fiancees of American military
In America, a marriage is
men: "[In Korea,] a marriage is between families ....
between individuals"); see also Hahm, supra note 31, at 294 n.144 ("Especially for the
parents' generation, the notion that a marriage is something in which the family must
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and enhance the social status of one or both sides. 124 Contemporary
marriage strategies reflect the tendencies of the yangban, 125 for
whom the choice of a spouse was a matter of status, and who refused
to take wives from lower status groups. 126 Lett notes that Korea's
middle class continues to observe the class endogamy of the yangban
past through the use of matchmakers or "newly developed
mechanisms" designed to screen proper candidates, thereby ensuring
127
family status.
3. Wealth
Although the term "social status" as used here is not
interchangeable with socioeconomic status, economic wealth does
contribute to one's social standing. Given the tremendous economic
growth and increased living standards enjoyed by many Koreans
beginning from the 1980s,128 social status has "come to depend more
on differences in wealth."'1 29 Economic and material wealth may thus
be one determinant of social status, reflecting Korea's emergent
success with capitalism, the likes of which was not foreseen in the
Confucian Chosun years. Although many yangban were of means,
especially those in high positions or those with land holdings, the

play a vital role is still very widespread.") (citing Hyon-Song Yi, Beh-oo-jah suhn-tehk
gwa-jong-eui byun-hwa-wah gyul-jung yo-in [Changes in the Process of Selecting
Spouses and its Causes], 9 GAH-JOK-HAHK NON-JIP [FAMILY STUDIES] 3 (1997)). See
generally LAUREL KENDALL, GETTING MARRIED IN KOREA: OF GENDER, MORALITY, AND

MODERNITY (1996) (discussing aspects of Korean marriage).
124.
LETT, supra note 17, at 211; see Mi-hui Kim, "In Praise of Older Women":
Gen-X Couples DiscardingOld DatingRules, KOREA HERALD, June 30, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 21232780 (stating that "marrying someone of your own social class and
education level" is one of the informal dating and marriage rules that Koreans usually
abide by). Obviously, not everyone can marry a partner of higher status.
125.
LETT, supra note 17, at 197.
126.
"Although never explicitly stated in the law codes, the strong status
consciousness of the yangban prohibited intermarriage with lower social groups so that
group endogamy was a major factor in the marriage strategy." LETT, supra note 17, at
182 (quoting Martina Deuchler, The Tradition: Women During the Yi Dynasty, in
VIRTUES IN CONFLICT: TRADITION AND THE KOREAN WOMAN TODAY 9-10 (Sandra

Matelli ed., 1977)). And what were the consequences of a yangban who transgressed?
Professor Kawashima notes that first, the descendants would not be yangban, and
second, "[s]uch a yangban had to pay for his act of social and ethical improprieties."
KAWASHIMA, supra note 39, at 9.
Korea's version of the forbidden love story is captured in Choon-Hyang-juhn (or
"Story of Chunhyang"), the culture's "most beloved love tale," about a romance between
the daughter of a female entertainer and a man of noble blood. Eun-joo Bae,
"Chunhyangin Love" Festival Features Various Versions of Classic Love Story, KOREA
HERALD, Apr. 3, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3365934.
127.
LETT, supra note 17, at 199.
128.
Id. at 40.
129.
Id. (citing Clark W. Sorensen, Ancestors and In-Laws: Kinship Beyond the
Family, in ASIA'S CULTURAL MOSAIC: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 118, 144

(Grant Evans ed., 1993)).
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idyllic life of the yangban meant a modest and humble lifestyle
without extravagance. 130 Contemporary Korean society has seen not
only an emerging middle class enjoying a commensurate economic
lifestyle, but also a significant number of those who experienced
sudden wealth as a result of real estate development and money
market speculation. 131 Those with economic means were seen
asserting status not with "traditional criteria such as ancestry and
education" but with conspicuous consumption, such as "expensive
housing, home furnishings, and trips abroad."'132 Yet although
economic wealth is an aspect of social status, it is a relatively new
determinant, 133 in contrast to the constants of education and family,
and wealth alone is not enough. Being "conspicuously rich" does not
necessarily mean wealth of culture, which evokes both characteristics
of proper education and family. 134 Those of recent wealth, in spite of
their newly acquired "trappings of an upper-class lifestyle . . . were
looked down upon by the descendants of yangban families who
claimed the noveaux riches had no culture and merely bought their
status."'135 As wealth is the least established means of determining
social status and the most mutable, it is also the most suspect.
C. Social Status at Law
The commentary would indicate that education and family
background, and to a lesser extent economic wealth, are key elements
in the contemporary societal construction of social status, and that
these three factors could be included in a practical definition of what

130.
Id. at 28-32 (discussing different ways yangban status was asserted
depending on family's assets and occupations).
131.
For example, those who owned land near the Seoul area during the years of
urban expansion became wealthy overnight. See LETT, supra note 17, at 59 (quoting
Sue Chang, Labor Pains: No End in Sight to Shortage of Workers, 9 BUSINESs KOREA

41, 42 (1992)).
132.
Id. at 211; cf. id. at 97 (noting that because "[1]egal status is no longer
legally defined or inherited . . . conspicuous consumption has become an important
means of asserting status regardless of educational level").
133.
Id. at 97.
134.
Id. at 98. Of course, one's wealth would allow his family to invest in the
children's education, by providing for private instruction and enhancing their chances
at admission to one of the top colleges, which would enhance their and the family's
social status. See STEINBERG, supra note 35, at 94.
135.
LETT, supra note 17, at 59. A reviewer echoed the point:
The nouveau riches are less honored than they might be ....

Recent wealth

tends to be denigrated not just by the upper class but by society at large, due to
a proclaimed lack of 'high-class culture.' The nouveau riche has a derogatory
connotation in the daily discourse of most Koreans.
Hong, supra note 24, at 678. The Korean byuh-rahk boo-jah, with byuh-rahk meaning
"thunder" and boo-jah meaning "wealthy person," is a term with a negative
connotation.
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comprises social status. Of interest then is the Korean understanding
of social status at law. What prompts the search for a legal definition
is the provision in the Korean Constitution that provides for equality
of all citizens before the law and explicitly prohibits discrimination
based on social status. That provision, Article 11, provides in full:
(1)

All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no
discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on
account of sex, religion or social status.

(2)

No privileged caste shall be recognized or ever established in any
form.

(3)

The awarding of decorations or distinctions of honor in any form
shall be effective only for recipients, and no privileges shall
136
ensue therefrom.

The substance of Article 11 has remained intact throughout Korea's
turbulent political history after it established an independent
government in 1948,137 and is one of the few provisions to remain
virtually unchanged over several constitutional revisions. 138 Some
historical development is necessary.
1. History of Article 11
Dr. Chin-O Yu, an eminent Korean legal expert of the day, is
credited with being the primary draftsman of the Korean
Constitution 139 and appears to have been the sole author of the

136.
S. KOREA CONST. art. 11.
137.
In the original Constitution adopted in 1948, the equal protection provision
was contained in Article 8. The provision saw minor changes in phrasing during the
amendments adopted in 1962 and 1987. See http://www3.assembly.go.kr/alkms/cgibinlcounter.cgi?lawscode=1001 (Art. 11). For the original 1948 version, see infra text
accompanying note 158.
138.
Most of the revisions were to accommodate power in the military regimes.
The most notable revision took place in 1987, "the year of the constitutional miracle,"
when nationwide protests and mounting criticism against the regime of Doo-Hwan
Chun led to substantial reforms, including direct popular election of the president. Kim
& Lee, supra note 21, at 303, 322; see also James M. West & Edward J. Baker, The
1987 Constitutional Reforms in South Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial
Independence, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA, supra note 59, at 222. The 1987 reforms
also led to the establishment of the Constitutional Court of Korea, with jurisdiction to
review cases of constitutional relevance. See S. KOREA CONST. arts. 111-13;
Constitutional Court Act, available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/english/welcome02.htm.
The Korean Supreme Court, an entirely separate body, is the "highest Court of the
state." See S. KOREA CONST. art. 101.
139.
HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 158 ("Korean experts outside the assembly,
like Yu, Chin-O were called on to do much drafting."); DONALD STONE MACDONALD,
U.S.-KOREAN RELATIONS FROM LIBERATION TO SELF-RELIANCE: THE TWENTY-YEAR
RECORD 170 (1992); Kim & Lee, supra note 21, at 305; see also Gregory Henderson,
Human Rights in South Korea 1945-1953, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA, supra note 59
(noting that national Assembly's Constitution Drafting Committee "extensively
consulted Korean experts, especially Mr. Yu Chin-O"). Yu's first-hand accounts on the
Constitution are available in CHIN-O YU, HUN-BUB-GI-CHO-HWE-GOH-ROK [MEMOIRS ON
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Korean equal protection provision. 140 Regarding equal protection
generally, Yu saw the principle of equality as universal, recognized in
almost all countries since the French Revolution. 141 Yu noted,
however, that because of the then still existing recognition of the
social aristocracy in post-liberation Korea, the Constitution makes
clear that "[n]o privileged caste shall be recognized or ever
established in any form."'1 42 Regarding the prohibition of
discrimination, Yu stated that gender discrimination was the key
portion of the provision, noting only briefly that equality regardless of
religion and social status was already established in Korea at the
time. 14 3 Presumably then, the prohibition based on social status was
to confirm this policy, and to protect descendants of classes from the
Chosun era against discrimination in the future. 144 Other than the
cursory references to sah-hweh-juhk shin-boon, Yu did not elaborate

DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION] (1981) [hereinafter Yu, MEMOIRS]; CHIN-O YU, HUNBUB-HAE-EUI [AN INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] (1949) [hereinafter YU, AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION]; Chin-O Yu, The Constitution of the Republic

of Korea: Its Ideal and Reality, 1 KOREANA Q. 5 (1960) [hereinafter Yu, Ideal and
Reality]. There is also a biography. Kwang-Suhk Chun, Hun-bub-hahk-jah Yu Chin 0
[Constitutional Scholar Yu Chin-O], 2 YON-SEI-BUB-HAHK-YEON-GOO

[YONSEI LAW

RESEARCH] 50 (1992).
140.

MACDONALD, supra note 139, at 170.

141.
142.

Yu, AN INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 139, at 34-35.
S. KOREA CONST. art. 11(2); S. KOREA CONST. 8(2) (1948); see YU, AN

INTERPRETATION

OF

THE

CONSTITUTION,

supra note

139,

at

34-35.

Indeed,

commentators agree that at the time of the drafting of the Korean Constitution,
although Japanese colonial rule did dismantle the formalized class system from the
Chosun dynasty, social aristocracy and class was still present. See CUMINGS, supra
note 46, at 53; Jong-Soo Lee, 'Sah-hwe-juhk shin-boon'eh eui-hahn cha-byul-geum-jieui hun-bub-juhk eui-mi [The ConstitutionalMeaning of Prohibitionof Discrimination
Based on "Social Status'], 31 GONG-BUB YEON-GOO [PUBLIC LAW] 351, 358 (2002).
143.
See YU, AN INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 139, at 3435; Lee, supra note 142, at 358 (citing CHIN-O YU, SHIN-GO HUN-BUN HAE-EUI [AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (REVISED)] 65-66 (1954)).

Notes from Yu's

memoirs indicate that the list of grounds on which discrimination is prohibited-sex,
faith, and social status-was not included in his original draft of the equal protection
provision. It was apparently added later, then deleted in the draft submitted to the
National Assembly Constitution Committee, then included again in the final version.
See YU,MEMOIRS, supra note 139, at 114, 182, 223.
144.
Kwang-Suhk Chun, Guk-gah-in-gwon-we-won-hwe Se-mi-na toh-rohn-wongoh [National Human Rights Commission Seminar Discussion Manuscript], in
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, GUK-GAH-IN-GWON-WE-WON-HWE JUHN-MOONGAH TOH-ROHN-HWE [NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SPECIALISTS SEMINAR] 53,
57 (2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SEMINAR]; Pil-Dong Kim,
"Guk-gah-in-gwon-we-won-hwe-buhb jeh-30-joh jeh-2-hahng-eui sah-hwe-juhk shinboon-eui buhm-we"eh deh-hahn toh-rohn yoh-ji [Summary of Discussionon "The Scope
of Social Status Provided in Section 2 Article 30 of the National Human Rights
Commission Act'], in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SEMINAR, supra, at 50,
51; Lee, supra note 142, at 358 (citing Soo-Woong Han, Pyung-deung-gwon-eui goo-johwah shim-sah-gi-joon [The Structure of the Equality Right and the Standard of
Review], 9 HUN-BUB-NOHN-CHONG [COLLECTION OF TREATISES ON THE CONSTITUTION]
40, 92-93 (1998)).
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in his writings on the meaning of the term. 145 There is precious little
from the literature at the time of the Constitution's drafting on what
social status was to include or how the prohibition of discrimination
based on that ground was to be applied in Korea when the
Constitution was adopted on July 17, 1948.146 Ultimately, the equal
protection provision is part of the Constitution that was hurriedly
debated and approved by the National Assembly in only two months
1 47
and may well bear "the marks and dangers of... haste."'
As an aside, in the task of drafting a constitution for the new
sovereign, Yu stated that he drew upon the constitutions of various
foreign countries, including that of Weimar Germany, 148 which had
prohibited "[p]ublic legal privileges or disadvantages of birth or of
rank.'149 Yu also reviewed an ordinance issued by the U.S. Army
Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), 150 which provided for
equal protection under the law as well as civil liberties found in the
U.S. Bill of Rights. 151 In addition, Yu acknowledged receiving a
proposed constitution drafted by USAMGIK legal staff,152 but did not
indicate what he took from it. Other sources say that the U.S.

145.
146.
147.

See generally YU, MEMOIRS, supra note 139.
The date is a national holiday in Korea, jeh-hun-juhl.
Henderson, supra note 139, at 157, 162.

148.

YU, MEMOIRS, supra note 139, at 22; see MACDONALD, supra note 139, at

170; Chun, supra note 139, at 52, 60 n.25.
149.

GERMAN REPUBLIC [WEIMAR] CONST. art. 109 (1919), reprinted in THE

WEIMAR REPUBLIC SOURCEBOOK 46, 49 (Anton Kaes et al. eds., 1994) (emphasis
added). The corresponding language in the current German Constitution provides: "No
one may be disadvantaged or favored because of his sex, parentage, race, language,
homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions." F.R.G. CONST. art.
3(3), available at http://www.jurisprundentia.de (emphasis added).
150.
At the close of World War II, U.S. forces occupied both Japan (the defeated
enemy) and the southern half of the Korean peninsula (a liberated former colony). See
generally KOREA UNDER THE AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1945-1948 (Bonnie
B.C. Oh ed., 2002); E. GRANT MEADE, THE AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT (1952).
Both were under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). A formal U.S. Army Military Government in
Korea (USAMGIK) was created a few months later, and operated as a unit under
MacArthur's ultimate authority. See MEADE, supra, at 76, 78. The military government
in both countries oversaw all aspects of society, and in Korea, until an independent
national government satisfactory to U.S. interests was established.
151.
Yu, MEMOIRS, supra note 139, at 22; see Chun, supra note 139, at 60 n.25;
Kim & Lee, supra note 21, at 306, 327 n.3. Professors Kim and Lee identify the
ordinance as "The Ordinance on the Rights of the Korean People," issued on April 7,
1948. Id. at 305. The late Professor Hahm referred to the "Proclamation of the Rights
of the Korean People," issued on April 5, 1948, which included various civil liberties of
the type included in the U.S. Bill of Rights. HAHM, supra note 2, at 151, 151 n.63 (citing
NATIONAL ECONOMIC BOARD, UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA, SOUTH
KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES (SKIGA) No. 31, Apr. 1948, at 167). A
review of the ordinances and proclamations issued by the USAMGIK in April 1948 do
not yield any provisions regarding equality regardless of "social status."
152.
MACDONALD, supra note 139, at 149-50, 170; YU, MEMOIRS, supra note 139,
at 22. The draft was written by Colonel Emery J. Woodall, a USAMGIK legal officer.
Kim & Lee, supranote 21, at 305.
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proposed draft was "largely disregarded" 153 and had no "significant
influence" in the creation of the Korean Constitution. 154 One source,
an interpretative summary of State Department archives, declares
that the final product "was prepared with little or no American
55
advice."1
Concerning the language of the equal protection provision and
the social status classification specifically, what Yu did not state
directly in his post-drafting writings is what seems all too obvious,
namely, that it was taken from the counterpart in the Japanese
Constitution, which was adopted two years before, in 1946.156 The
very similar content and phrasing in the two equal protection
provisions supports this view:
Japan:

Korea:

All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be
no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations
15 7
because of race, creed, sex, social status, or family origin.
All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be
no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural
158
life on account of sex, faith or social status.

It should be noted that some commentators see the Japanese
Constitution as essentially a product of the U.S. military, reflecting

MACDONALD, supra note 139, at 170.
154.
Kim & Lee, supra note 21, at 305.
155.
MACDONALD, supra note 139, at 149-50. Although it is not certain how
much Yu and those working with him were influenced by American equal protection
principles, the Fourteenth Amendment's general guarantee of "equal protection of the
laws" was not known internationally to provide for equality regardless of social status
specifically.
Interestingly, however, at about the time when the U.S. military
government oversaw affairs in Korea, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case with
social status implications in Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). There, the
clerk of court and jury commissioner of a California court had excluded from the jury
lists "all persons who work for a daily wage." Id. at 221. The Court stated:
153.

Were we to sanction an exclusion of this nature we would encourage whatever
desires those responsible for the selection of jury panels may have to
discriminate against persons of low economic and social status. We would
breathe life into any latent tendencies to establish the jury as the instrument of
the economically and socially privileged. That we refuse to do.
Id. at 223-24.
156.
Korean drafters could have had available the Japanese Constitution (or the
MacArthur draft), and simply adopted the equal protection language therein, with
minor modifications. Or perhaps U.S. advisors in Japan familiar with the Government
Section's work could have simply forwarded the equal protection language to U.S.
advisors in Korea, whose work was not yet finished, who in turn made it available to
the drafting committee or Yu.
157.
JAPAN CONST. art. 14, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/
ja00000_.html.
158.
S.KOREA CONST. art. 8(1) (1948), available at http://www3.assembly.go.kr/
alkms/cgi-binlcounter.cgi?lawscode=1001 (Article 11; 1948 version) (Korean text). The
term "faith" was later amended to "religion."
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MacArthur's wishes and concerns about post-War Japan. 159 The
entire process of drafting the Constitution was met with considerable
discomfort by the Japanese. 160 The Japanese equal protection
provision was merely one example. 16 1 As one U.S. participant in the

159.
See GLENN D. HOOK & GAVAN MCCORMACK, JAPAN'S CONTESTED
CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 3 (2001) (noting that key principles of the
constitution were "presented as a virtual ultimatum" and "non-negotiable demands
imposed by the war's victors"); John M. Maki, The Japanese Constitutional Style, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-1967 3, 9 (Dan Fenno
Henderson ed., 1968) ("Although both the occupation and the Japanese government
strove to maintain the fiction that the draft was a Japanese product, it was an open
secret that it was not.").
160.
General Douglas MacArthur was anxious for a new constitution to be
adopted for post-war Japan. He rejected a revised constitution that the Japanese
government had proposed (as too similar to the previous one), and directed the
Government Section of SCAP, headed by a confidant, to draft a new one in secret. See
Nobuyoshi Ashibe, Lawrence W. Beer & Masami Ito, The United States Constitution
and Japan's Constitutional Law, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY ASIA, supra note 21, at 128, 179; see also Lawrence W. Beer,
Constitutionalismand Rights in Japan and Korea, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 225, 232-33 (Louis
Henkin & Albert Rosenthal eds., 1990). In eight days, the Government Section
submitted a draft to MacArthur, who in turn ordered revisions toward a "MacArthur
draft," which was given to the Japanese. Id. at 233.
There is a fascinating series of events that occurred from the MacArthur draft to
the final version of the Japanese Constitution, which author Dale Hellegers recounts in
vivid detail, and is summarized here. DALE M. HELLEGERS, WE THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:
WORLD WAR II AND THE ORIGINS OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION (2001). When the
Government Section submitted the MacArthur draft to Japanese officials, the latter
had been expecting to discuss the revised constitution that they had proposed shortly
before, and not to be confronted with a new U.S. draft. Id. at 528; BEATE SIROTA
GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM; A MEMOIR 121 (1997). Stunned, shocked,
and with little choice, the Japanese side relented. Initially, Japanese officials agreed
that the Japanese government would "begin to adapt the American document and put
it into 'proper language."' HELLEGERS, supra, at 535. The MacArthur draft was
translated into Japanese, with some revisions and omissions from the English version,
which the U.S. side discovered with consternation when the Japanese version was
translated back into English. An "atmosphere of mistrust and rancor" set in. Id. at 540.
After tense discussions, flaring tempers, and around-the-clock translations, both sides
saw the wisdom of eventual compromise. Id. at 537-43. A final version was released by
the Japanese government as its own.
161.
Initially, a committee of three persons was given the task of drafting the
civil rights portion of the text. The equal protection language that the Civil Rights
Committee submitted read in principal part: "All persons are equal before the law. No
discrimination shall be authorized or tolerated in political, economic, educational, and
domestic relations on account of race, creed, sex, caste or national origin." HELLEGERS,
supra note 160, at 585 (emphasis added). The Steering Committee left this language
intact, and submitted it to MacArthur for approval. MacArthur apparently directed
that "social status" be added to the list of classifications, and approved the remaining
language in the provision, so as to read: "No discrimination shall be authorized or
tolerated in political, economic or social relations on account of race, creed, sex, social
status, caste or national origin." Id. at 679. The MacArthur draft was the first of the
multiple versions of the proposed constitution that include "social status" in haec verba.
The version that the Japanese government had prepared for release retains "social
status," deletes "caste" and adds "family origin," to read in relevant part: "[T]here shall
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discussions recalled, "[t]he formulas guaranteeing democracy and
equality ...were not things [the Japanese] could easily accept. '16 2 In
1968, Professor John Maki offered alternative assessments of the U.S.
imposition of the equal protection language, stating:
The most important provisions relating to nondiscrimination were
those involving sex and social status. Twenty years ago [1948] Articles
13 [which provides that "[a]ll of the people shall be respected *as
individuals" 163] and 14 [the equal protection provision] were regarded
at best as being harmless statements of general principles to which
obeisance had to be made as a matter of democratic good form, and at
worst as demonstrations of the ignorant contempt of the occupation in
164
its dealings with many elements of the Japanese social tradition.

Ultimately, if the similarity in the language of the Japanese and
Korean equal protection provisions is evidence that the Korean
version is merely a transplant of the Japanese counterpart, 165 then
the result is an equal protection mandate in Korea that is essentially
the product of what the U.S. military, namely Douglas MacArthur,
perceived (whether correctly or incorrectly) would be an appropriate
equal protection law for Japan, one that was imposed on the country
without Japanese input or consideration. 166 In the final analysis, the
Korean equal protection provision, like much of Korean law, appears
to be based on the Japanese version.167
2. Contemporary Discussion
The meaning of social status has drawn increasing interest from
Korean commentators in the contemporary setting. 168 A leading

be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex,
social status or family origin." Id. This is the version that was ultimately adopted and
is in effect today.
162.
GORDON, supra note 160, at 121.
163.
JAPAN CONST. art. 13.
164.
Maki, supra note 159, at 32.
165.
Given the great similarity between the Japanese and Korean equal
protection provisions, one might expect that it be more readily noted in the
commentary. It has received far less mention. See Byung-Sahk Koo, Han.guk hun-bubgwa Il-bohn hun-bub.eui teuk-ji [Features of Korean Constitution and Japanese
Constitution], 1 IL-BOHN HAHK-BOH [JOURNAL OF JAPANOLOGY] 5, 23 (1973); Lee, supra
note 142, at 360 n.23.
166.
Maki, supra note 159, at 31-32 (discussing U.S. influence on Japanese
Constitution).
167.
This is part of an ongoing irony. There has been continuing social and
political tension between the two countries since Korea declared its independence from
Japan. Yet much of Korean law, legal system, and legal education is based on the
system that Japan imposed during colonial rule.
168.
See, e.g., Lee, supranote 142. The definition of social status was the focus of
a conference sponsored by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea in October
2002, with participants discussing the meaning of the term in the Korean Constitution
and the National Human Rights Commission Act, No. 6481 (2001). For a press account
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treatise on Korean constitutional law introduces the two common
approaches to the meaning of social status under law. 169 The
"congenital," or inherited approach, provides that status is
determined at birth; the "posteriori" approach includes, in addition to
status determined at birth, status acquired after birth and occupied
for a lengthy period of time. 170 The congenital approach, which would
include descendants of a number of classes of persons, 17 1 has been
criticized as unduly narrow. 172 Although this approach would honor
the original concern of discrimination against descendants of classes
from the yangban era, the class system has long since been formally
abolished, 173 and the approach would have limited application in
modern Korea. The posteriori approach 174 would better address
contemporary society, but it too has been criticized, for its

of the conference and discussion, see Sah-hwe-juhk shin-boon Moo-uht-shin gah? [What
is Social Status?], KOREAN PROGRESSIVE NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.kpna.net/newsPrint.php?number+456 (copy on file with author). A press
release in English text announcing the conference is available on the commission's
See
http://www.humanrights.go.kr/eng/about/news/
site.
Internet
NeComitNewsView.sp?seqid=19 (copy on file with author). Commentary resulting
from the conference was published in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SEMINAR,
supra note 144. Relevant articles therein are: Hong-Suhk Cho, Guk-gah-in-gwon-wewon-hwe-buhb jeh-30-joh jeh-2-hahng-eui sah-hwe-juhk shin-boon-eui buhm-we [The
Scope of Social Status Provided in Section 2 Article 30 of the National Human Rights
Commission Act], in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SEMINAR, supra note 144,
at 3; Chun, supra note 144; Kim, supra note 144; Huhn-Hwan Lee, Bool-hwak-junggeh-nyum-eui heh-suhk-gwa geu juhk-yong [The Interpretationof Ambiguous Concepts
and Its Application], in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SEMINAR, supra note
144, at 43; Ki-Choon Song, Guk-gah-in-gwon-we-won-hwe-buhbjeh-30-joh jeh-2-hahng
heh-suhk-sahng eui hahn moon-jeh [A Problem in the Interpretationof Section 2, Article
30 of the National Human Rights Commission Act], in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION SEMINAR, supra note 144, at 21.

LAW
[CONSTITUTIONAL
KIM,
HUN-BUB-HAHK-GEH-ROHN
TSCHOLSU
169.
TREATISE] 408-09 (13th ed. 2002).
170.
Id. at 409. The congenital v. posteriori approach to social status seen in
Korean legal commentary correlates to the distinction between "ascribed" and
"achieved" status discussed by one sociologist: ascribed status "refers to certain
attributes of persons over which they have little or no control, such as race, gender or
age," whereas "achieved status" refers to the position which a person may achieve, for
example through educational competition. TURNER, supra note 19, at 4.
171.
Under this approach, social status would include persons born out of
wedlock, those of a particular race, and descendants of naturalized citizens, convicted
criminals, and the Chosun classes. See KIM, supra note 169, at 409; see also Cho, supra
note 168, at 6.
Cho, supra note 168, at 8; Lee, supra note 142, at 359.
172.
Lee, supra note 142, at 359.
173.
Under the posteriori approach, social status would include, for example,
174.
naturalized citizens, convicted criminals, and residents of a particular region. See KIM,
supra note 169, at 409; Cho, supra note 168, at 6. But given its definition, the approach
could include anyone holding a particular occupation-e.g., teachers, civil servants,
farmers, fishermen, merchants, students-as well as the rich and the poor. See KIM,
supra note 169, at 409. One commentator specifically rejects the notion that economic
wealth is a form of social status. See Lee, supra note 142, at 362.
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overbreadth. 175 Even with the limitation that status must attach for
some time, discrimination could be claimed based on a host of
conditions. Nevertheless, perhaps by process of elimination, the
1 76
posteriori approach is favored by a majority of the commentators.
One commentator has proposed a third approach, urging that social
status refer to "historically oppressed groups," so that the status
classification would have equivalent weight and measure when
compared with sex and religion, the other classifications explicitly
listed. 177 Under this theory, the drafters kept open the possibility
that new types of social status comparable to that seen in the social
178
aristocracy could arise.
Adding to the confusion surrounding the meaning of social status
1 79
is the provision of the National Human Rights Commission Act
that includes social status as a ground on which "discriminatory act
of violating the right of equality" may occur.180 Yet social status is one
of eighteen grounds on which discrimination is subject to agency
review, including, among others, sex, religion, regional origin, and
family status.' 8 ' This has raised questions of whether the meaning of
"social status" is the same in both the Constitution and the statute,
and whether in the latter social status and the other grounds overlap
or are mutually exclusive.' 8 2 Some lament that the term is an open83
ended concept.1
For its part, the Constitutional Court of Korea has ruled that
social status is "status that a person occupies for a long term, that is
accompanied by social estimation,"'1 4 taking a posteriori approach.
The Court gave this definition in a case involving the
constitutionality of a law that imposed enhanced punishment to those

175.

Cho, supra note 168, at 8; Lee, supra note 142, at 362.

176.
See KIM, supra note 169, at 409. Then there is the question of whether the
meaning of social status depends on whether the list of grounds on which
discrimination is proscribed-social status, sex and religion-is intended to be
illustrative or exhaustive. See Cho, supra note 168, at 8; Chun, supra note 144, at 54;
Lee, supra note 168, at 45; Song, supra note 168, at 28.

177.
Do-Soo Hwang, Hun-bub-jeh-pahn-eui shim-sah-gi-joon-eu-roh-suh-eui
pyung-deung [Equality as a Standard of Review in the Constitutional Court] 142 (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University College of Law) (on file
with author).
178.
Id.; see also Lee, supra note 142, at 361-62.
179.
National Human Rights Commission Act, No. 6481 (2001). An English
version
of the
act
is
available
at
http://www.humanrights.go.kr/eng
dataroom/committee dataDaComitBookView.jsp?choiceboard id=all&search=&choice
=&seqid=76&page-num=l (copy on file with author).
180.
Id. art. 30(2).
181.
Id. Powers of the National Human Rights Commission are discussed infra
note 194.

182.
183.

See Chun, supra note 144, at 60.
Cho, supra note 168, at 16; Chun, supra note 144, at 61; Lee, supra note

168, at 47.

184.

93 Hun-Bah 43, Feb. 23, 1995.
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convicted of repeated crimes.18 5 The plaintiff argued that the
additional punishment amounted to discrimination based on his
social status-that of being a repeat offender-in contrast to those
convicted of a first time offense, who would not face such
punishment.1 8 6 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the law,
reasoning that it was reasonable action and permissible
discrimination.1 87 In its decision, the Court did not further elaborate
on defining social status nor did it provide an illustrative or
exhaustive list of the types of social status intended by Article 11.188
Thus, what has emerged is a general description of the term by the
Court, with observers attempting to compile a list based on case
decisions where social status is implicated.18 9 No definitive list of
what qualifies as social status has been offered to date. Whether the
Constitutional Court would endorse educational background, family
background, or wealth, or some combination thereof (all of which
would seem to fit under the Court's general guideline of significant
length in time and social estimation) as coming within its definition
of social status is unclear.
D. Status Discrimination
If status consciousness is prevalent in Korea, and there exist
differences among members of Korean society along status lines,
prejudice against those of lower status is inevitable. Professor John
Lie writes that in the mid-1980s when inequality, class distinctions,
and class consciousness became more keen in Korean society, "class
prejudices were openly expressed." 190 Importantly, not all instances of
prejudice based on social status in Korea amount to discrimination
proscribed by law. The U.S. doctrine that the law prohibits only

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
E.g., Cho, supra note 168, at 7.

190.

JOHN LIE, HAN UNBOUND: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH KOREA 136

(1998). Professor Hagen Koo offers the narrative of one factory worker lamenting the
class prejudice:
Women working in factories are kongsuni; men working in factories are
kongdoli. [These terms are generally derogatory.] Kongsuni and kongdoli are
contemptible guys, nothing worth counting, just loose folks. They call us this
way as a whole group. We have to be kongsuni even if we hate it, simply
because we are working in factories. If someone asks us where we are working,
we simply say, "I work at a small company." . . . People fault us for spending
money on appearance without making enough money, but our reason is to take
off the label of kongsuni they put on us.
Hagen Koo, The State, Minjung, and the Working Class in South Korea, in STATE AND
SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA 131, 152 (Hagen Koo ed., 1993), quoted in LIE,
supra, at 136.
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discriminatory activity by state action' 91 also applies in the Korean
setting. That is, the equal protection provision in Article 11 of the
Korean Constitution applies directly to government, and not private,
action. 19 2 The guarantee of equality and the prohibition of
discrimination do not apply to a private actor unless a specific statute
so provides, and such statutes have been enacted, most frequently for
the employment setting. 193 The Labor Standards Act explicitly
prohibits discrimination in employment based on social status and
applies to private employers. 194 Although this Article does not seek to
provide a comprehensive survey of prohibited discriminatory activity
in contemporary Korean society, some examples will be helpful. In
the employment setting, anecdotal evidence is available to show
discrimination in hiring based on one's hahk-buhl.195 Although

191.

See generally ERWIN

CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND

POLICIES § 6.4, at 486-517 (2d ed. 2002).
192.
This is implicit in the decisions of the Constitutional Court and is the
majority view of the commentators. See YOUNG-SUNG KWON, HUN-BUB-HAHK-WONROHN [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A TEXTBOOK] 316-18 (rev. ed. 2001).

193.
Id.
194.
Labor Standards Act, No. 6507, arts. 5, 10, 15 (2001), available at
http://www.moleg.go.kr/mlawinfo/english/htms/html/law33.html
(copy on file with
author).
Of interest within this discussion is the National Human Rights Commission Act,
which was enacted with the general purpose of "ensuring that inviolable, fundamental
human rights of all individuals are protected." National Human Rights Commission
Act, No. 6481, art. 1 (2001). The statute authorizes the National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC) to review claims of discrimination on account of social status (or
several other grounds). The law applies to both government and private parties, and
covers alleged discrimination in employment, public services, and education and
vocational training. Id. art. 30(2). Alleged victims of "unreasonable discrimination"
may file a petition to the NHRC, which has authority to, among other things,
investigate the discrimination, make recommendations to the respondent party, offer
conciliation services, and refer the matter for prosecution or to an appropriate
government agency. Id. arts. 19-29, 30(1). If the petitioner pursues a remedy in a court
of competent jurisdiction, the NHRC may provide its opinions to the court. Id. art.
28(2). Questions have risen in the public commentary as to whether the act or the
agency is powerless to protect equality rights. See In-won-we.gah 'mah-dahng-bahl'-in
i-yu [The Reason Why the NHRC Became a 'Nuisance], HAN-GYU-REH, June 20, 2003,
available at http://www.hani.co.kr/section-001033000/2003/06/00103300020030620182
4212.html (copy on file with author).
195.
Examples are available from "Antihakbul, a civic group against the deeprooted school ties system in Korea." Kyung-hwa Shin, Professors' Group Objects to
Deep-seated Academic Cartel, KOREA HERALD, Apr. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL
8117391. The Internet site for the group included a posting from a person who candidly
acknowledged benefiting from discrimination. The individual
majored in engineering at Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology
(KAIST) and was recently hired for a computer-related post. The writer,
however, hinted that his employment was not fair.
' The other applicant ...,I think, is more qualified for the job than [I]. While I
have little knowledge about computers and my GPA is low, he specialized in
computers and had a high grade point average," he said. "I think the company
didn't hire him because he didn't graduate from a high-level university."
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without empirical data, it is difficult to assess how widespread status
discrimination is in hiring, retention, and promotion in employment,
the view persists that top positions in government and industry in
Korea are occupied by graduates of the elite universities, with the
college attended as the primary, if not the only, qualification for
entry. 196 In the education setting, a revealing work by Professor
James Robinson argues that despite egalitarian reforms by the
Korean government, there remains bias and institutionalized
discriminatory treatment of primary school students in Korea based
on the social status of the students' families. 197 Specifically, his
research found a significant relationship between teachers'
perceptions of students' social status and teachers' actions in denying,
or providing learning opportunities in the classroom. 198 Such biased
treatment has an impact in a society where the college to which one
gains admission is a critical determinant of individual lifestyle, and
preparations for the college entrance examination begin in the early
years. Whether individuals who are subject to discriminatory
treatment in employment, education, or other settings due to their
relatively lower social status resign themselves to the realities of
societal norms or are willing to seek legal redress is a matter that
deserves further study.

Id.
196.
See id. (reporting view of professor that "the most serious problem of the
academic clique is that graduates from the small number of top-level.universities have
obtained exclusive possession of significant posts in the Korean society."). Seoul
National University, Korea University, and Yonsei University are generally considered
to be the three universities in the elite tier. According to publicly available sources,
over 85 percent of the attorneys admitted to the Korean bar at the three largest law
firms in Korea completed their undergraduate studies at Seoul National, and nearly 95
percent did so at one of the top three universities. See http://www.martindale.comlxp/
Martindale/LawyerLocator/SearchLawyerLocator/firmsearch.xmlwww.martindale.
com (entries for Kim & Chang, Lee & Ko); http://www.shinkim.com/english/html/
member.asp. Typically, candidates take the equivalent of the U.S. bar examination
after completing undergraduate studies; successful candidates then complete a twoyear program at the Judicial Research and Training Institute (JRTI). Some may urge
that hiring in the law firms is based entirely on merit-i.e., class rankings in the
JRTI-and that undergraduate affiliations is coincidental.
197.
Robinson, supra note 4, at 519-23. The study is elaborated in further detail
infra text accompanying notes 211-13.
198.
Id. at 519. One may point out that in the United States too, teachers'
perceptions of students' social status, as well as their intelligence, or a whole host of
other characteristics, can and do influence teaching behavior. This is not disputed. The
instructive point here is that not all of these characteristics relate to classifications
that the law does not permit.
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E. FunctionalEquivalence?'9 9
To be clear: Race in the United States and social status in Korea
are not the same. 200 Indeed, social scientists from various disciplines
201
will note differences between race and social status generally.
Perhaps the most glaring distinction is that while one's race (in most
cases) is immediately obvious, one's social status is not, often
requiring inquiry or investigation. 20 2 Another is that while race is

199.
Given the partisan regionalism in Korea and historical discrimination
against those from certain provinces in employment, politics, and marriage, some may
argue that regional origin presents a stronger case for functional equivalence to race.
One commentator gave a passing reference to the race/regional origin analogy: "[I]f
race and racial relations . . . play a key role in the United States politics, region and
regionalism have been conspicuous in South Korean politics." Sung Chul Yang, South
Korea's Top Bureaucratic Elites, 1948-1993. Their Recruitment Patterns and Modal
Characteristics,34 KOREA J. 5, 5 (1994). The discussion among policy makers in Korea
has already expanded to a debate over implementing U.S.-style affirmative action
programs to provide for preferential treatment in education and government civil
service based on regional origin. See Howard W. French, South Koreans Seek
Affirmative Action To End Regional Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, § 1, at 14.
Regarding discrimination and prejudice against those from a particular location in the
U.S. setting, of interest is Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOwA L. REV. 273 (2003).
Professor Bassett calls attention to the "long standing, pervasive form of discrimination
against rural dwellers" in the United States, especially in the areas of education and
employment. Id. at 341.
200.
Nor is race exclusive to the United States and social status exclusive to
Korea. Race (primarily, one race) also exists in Korea, just as status consciousness is
present in the United States. In the U.S. setting, race and class are not mutually
exclusive. See generally Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the
Pursuit of Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1995)
(discussing relationship between class and race in U.S. society). One difference between
the U.S. and the Korean setting is that the Korean Constitution, unlike the U.S.
counterpart, explicitly prohibits discrimination on account of social status. See S.
KOREA CONST. art. 11(1).

201.
For example, in basic terms, an anthropologist would likely question whether
social status presents a "distinctive, hereditarily transmissible physical characteristic[ ],"
CHARLES WINICK, DICTIONARY OF ANTHROPOLOGY 448 (1956), and note simply that status
does not lead to separation of persons "on the basis of arbitrarily selected phenotypic
traits," ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANTHROPOLOGY 326 (David E. Hunter & Phillip Whitten eds.,
1976); a sociologist would challenge the notion that race necessarily equates with "a
position occupied by an individual in a social system," ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE
BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF SOcIOLOGY: A USER'S GUIDE TO SOCIOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

279 (1995); see DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 293 (Henry Pratt Fairchild ed., 1944). In both
anthropology and sociology, race and social status are seen as distinguishable traits, with
separate definitions.
202.
But even this is not beyond debate. Granted, one's social status cannot be
recorded instantaneously by a visual sensation; yet those familiar with Korean society
will point out that individual social status can sometimes be accurately estimated after
a brief encounter or exchange. There is also the view that one cannot always hide one's
social status. See Koo, supra note 190, at 152 (quoting a factory worker: "[K]ongsuni
cannot really hide their identity. They show it however hard they try to do makeup and
dress up nicely").
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fixed at birth and therefore immutable,20 3 social status, in contrast, is
neither fixed nor unchangeable, since it may be enhanced or lowered
in the course of a lifetime. It is urged here that such distinctions be
the starting point for the discussion of the equivalence of race in the
United States and social status in Korea 20 4 and not the definitive
rejection of the two as non-identical concepts. For even
acknowledging that race and social status are not tautological or
interchangeable, race in the U.S. experience and social status in the
Korean counterpart share many of the same characteristics in
function, history, and impact.
Initially, one may question the degree to which social status in
Korea is immutable. 20 5 In this regard, although the Constitutional
Court's definition of social status is somewhat general, its limitation
that the status must attach for some period of length 20 6 suggests that
it is not so easily changeable, on the presumption that if one could
readily alter the status to avoid discrimination, he would do so. Nor is
social status so mutable if it is determined, as discussed above, by the
three factors of education, family, and (in less part) wealth.
Beginning with family, it is a fair assessment that for many Koreans,
the social status of one's family is established by the time of his birth,
if not before. 20 7 The educational achievement of the parents is fixed
by that time, and although their occupational and economic positions
are not permanent, it is at a point within a predictable progression of
promotion and seniority. 20 8 Regarding education, although one's
educational status is established, not at birth, but by the late teens
with the results of the college entrance exams, 20 9 there is much to

203.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (describing race, gender, and
ethnic background as immutable characteristics); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 686 (1973) (describing sex, race, and national origin as immutable characteristics).
Critical race theorists and those who see race as socially constructed would challenge
the notion of immutability of race. E.g., Haney Lopez, supra note 77.
204.
Perhaps some will prefer the less direct characterization of social status in
Korea as analogous to race in the United States, or social status and race in the
respective societies as homologous characteristics.
205.
One is reminded of Professor Hahm's statement that Korea is "a society
where all of man's political capacity is determined at birth." HAHM, supra note 37, at
34.

206.
93 Hun-Bah 43, Feb. 23, 1995.
207.
One indicator of this is the great relevance of social status in the selection
of a spouse. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
208.
Korea is not a society that sees much career change in adulthood, although
the numbers are increasing. See JU-YEON CHUNG, SUHN-JIN-GUK-GWA HAN-GUK-EUI
JIK-UB-GYO-YUK: HOOL-LYUN JEH-DOH-EUI TEUK-SUNG-GWA HAN-GEH [VOCATIONAL
EDUCATION IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND IN KOREA: FEATURES OF TRAINING SYSTEMS

AND THEIR LIMITS] 225 (2002) (noting tendency to search for pyung-seng-jik-jang, or
"lifetime job").
209.
Some students who are not successful in their attempts to win admission to
the college of their choice in a given year try a second time the following year (jeh-soo),
and some even try a third time (sahm-soo). See LETT, supra note 17, at 180.
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indicate that the social status of one's family has a great impact on
one's ultimate educational opportunity. 210 Professor Robinson's study
indicates a positive relationship between teachers' perceptions of a
student's family social status and the student's academic
achievement. 211 He confirms a process of "converting social status to
academic achievement," namely,
(1) ... teachers acquire expectations of the social status of parents,[2 1 2]
(2) ... these expectations influence teacher control and call-on behaviors
with students, (3) ... these expectations and interactional patterns
between the teacher and the students affect peer group membership, and
213
(4)... these variables affect the academic achievement of the child.

Moreover, a study by Korean researchers indicates a correlation
between the higher education opportunities of high school seniors and
the educational levels of the students' parents. 2 14 Simply, students
whose parents have a relatively lower educational background do not
have the opportunities of those whose parents acheived higher
215
educations.

210.
Admission to Korea's universities is determined, in the vast majority of
cases, by entrance examination scores in open competition. It is not suggested here
that preferential or discriminatory treatment based on social status occurs in college
admissions. Still, some question whether the competition for college admission is fair
or real, since a student's chances are shaped by his family's circumstance. See LIE,
supra note 190, at 135 ("High test scores and entrance to prestigious universities
depended on urban residence, access to cram schools, and the ability to hire private
tutors, all out of reach for the child of the average worker."); Shin, supra note 195
(reporting comments of Korean professor who urges that "high school students start
from different environments such as the level of their parents' wealth").
211.
Robinson, supra note 4, at 506. Putting it bluntly, teacher expectations of
social status influence academic achievement, since "the teacher more tightly controls
the lower [socioeconomic status) child and interacts more with the higher [socieconomic
status] child, who achieves a higher social position in the classroom." Id.
212.
Professor Robinson appears to use "social status" interchangeably with
"socioeconomic status." For purposes of his study, status is determined by the student's
father's education, mother's education, and father's occupation. Id. at 509.
213.
Id. at 515.
214.
The Korea Labor Institute conducted a survey of the families of 2,476 high
school graduates nationwide. It revealed that about 70 percent of students with collegeeducated parents won admission to four-year colleges, in contrast to 45 percent for
children of high school graduates, and 27.1 percent for those with parents having less
education. Children of Educated ParentsFound To Enter Good Colleges, KOREA TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25565863. The correlation was also seen in the
level of colleges to which students were admitted: 44.9 percent of the children of college
graduates entered colleges ranked in the top 25 percent, mostly in Seoul, in contrast to
25 percent of children with parents with only high school diplomas, and 15.4 percent of
children with less than high school education. The same study also reported a
correlation between college opportunities for students and the students' parents'
employment status (white collar v. blue collar v. farmers and fishermen) and location
(urban v. rural areas). Id.
215.
Id. One of the researchers asserted that "[r]ather than economic factors, the
educational and social status of the parents were found to affect the future of their
children." Id.

2004]

SOCIAL STATUS AND KOREAN LAW

147

This impediment against mobility merely persists after one's
college affiliation is determined. Korean observers urge that the
notion of opportunities for upward mobility in free competition and
216
reward for merit regardless of collegiate letters is a myth.
Professor Hoon Hong urges that a consequence of the hahk-buhl
mentality in Korea is that graduates of the elite universities have
exclusive control of the significant positions in Korean society,
excluding those from other universities and allowing school
connections to operate as a "caste system. '217 He continues, "Once a
university is determined in one's late teens, his/her 'class' in the
'218
future is set.
Regarding wealth, assuming that wealth is increasingly
becoming a factor in determining social status, it too is not fixed at
birth. Again, however, to the extent that one's wealth is shaped by
the status of one's parents, indications for the chances of one's wealth
are in place by the time of one's birth. There are exceptions, of course,
and these exceptions may provide the best possibility for upward
mobility, and mutable social status. In recent years, a significant
number of people in Korea experienced sudden increase in economic
ability due to prosperous times, and perhaps a commensurate
increase in status. 2 19 But as indicated above, wealth by itself does not
ensure status, and sudden wealth has a derogatory connotation. 220 In
short, while social status in Korea may not be as fixed and immutable
as race is in the United States, social status is far less mutable in
practice than it may seem in theory and is far more predictable.
In advancing the cause for the equivalence of race in the United
States and social status in Korea, a foremost commonality is that race
and social status by their very nature serve to divide members of the
respective societies, directly and unabashedly. This dividing function
is inherent in the meaning of the two terms and may well be
definitional. Whether race in the United States is understood
biologically or as a sociopolitical construct, race, to put it bluntly,
divides. 221 Indeed, Webster's offers as one definition of race "a division

216.
See Shin, supra note 195. Despite reports that Korean society was moving
away from the tradition of relying on one's college affiliation, and toward consideration
of individual merit based upon free competition, some argue that "Korea has become a
more academic clique-centered nation than before." Id.
217.
Id.
218.
Id.
219.
Id.
220.
See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
221.

ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,

UNEQUAL 3-4 (1992) ("As a social and human division, [race] surpasses all others.");
RICHARD M. MERELMAN,

REPRESENTING

BLACK CULTURE

3 (1995) ("Race divides

Americans into groups of sharply unequal economic status and degrees of authority in
social and political institutions."); Richard Briffault, Lani Guinierand the Dilemmas of
American Democracy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 418, 467 (1995) (reviewing LANI GUINIER, THE
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
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of mankind possessing traits that are transmissible by descent and
sufficient to characterize it as a distinct human type. ' 222 Likewise,
social status in Korea also divides, and the dividing function is
incorporated in the very presentation of the term, sah-hwe-juhk shinboon. The instructive portion is shin-boon, with both shin and boon in
Korean Hangul taken from the Chinese characters, shun and feung,
respectively. 223 The term shun means "body, person; hull; oneself, I,
me; lifetime,"224 and feung means "divide; separate; duty; distinguish;
measure; part; minute. '22 5 Thus, shin-boon literally refers to the
226
division of persons.
Even acknowledging the common function of race and social
status, some will be quick to point out that the function was most
applicable in the United States and Korea of centuries past and is far
less so now. Indeed, traditionally, race in the United States and social
status in Korea were both black and white issues: race in the United
States meant white or black; 227 social status in Korea meant yangban
or non-yangban. 228 In contemporary U.S. society, race has become a
more inclusive term, and the discussion of race, ancestry, or ethnicity
229
includes not only whites and blacks, but Latinos and Asians,

(1994)) ("Race is one of the fundamental divisions in our society."); Viet D. Dinh, Races,
Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1299 (1998) (reviewing RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW (1997)) ("Race is indeed one of the great causes of
factions in our history."); John A. Powell, A Minority-Majority Nation: Racing the
Population in the Twenty-First Century, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 1415 (2002)
("Race is the vehicle through which we can include or exclude; stratify or equalize;
divide or combine.").
222.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 75, at 1870

(emphasis added). See also WINICK, supra note 201, at 448 (defining race as "[a] major
division of mankind, with distinctive, hereditarily transmiss[i]ble characteristics, e.g.,
the Negroid, Mongoloid, and Caucasoid races") (emphasis added). Another dictionary
includes as a definition, "One of the greatest divisions of mankind, having certain
physical peculiarities in common." XIII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 67, 69 (2d
ed. 1989) (emphasis added). But in a change from its previous 1933 edition, The Oxford
English Dictionary adds, "The term is often used imprecisely; even among
anthropologists there is no generally accepted classification or terminology." Id.
223.
In the official version of the Korean Constitution, sah-hwe-juhk shin-boon is
provided in Chinese characters.
224.
BRUCE K. GRANT, A GUIDE TO KOREAN CHARACTERS: READING AND WRITING
HANGUL AND HANJA 93 (2d rev. ed. 1982).
225.
Id. at 38 (emphasis added). For definitions of shin-boon in Korean-English
and Korean dictionaries, see supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
226.
As noted above, "social status" in English refers less pointedly to one's
condition, position or the standing of a companion. See supra note 98.
227.
See Robert S. Chang, Dreaming in Black and White: Racial-Sexual Policing
in The Birth of a Nation, The Cheat, and Who Killed Vincent Chin?, 5 ASIAN L.J. 41, 42
(1998) (discussing U.S. racial paradigm in which race "is generally understood to mean
black and white").
228.
See Kim, supra note 70, at 5-6.
229.
For an interesting examination of the Asian-American experience through
the conventional black-white lens, see generally Janine Young Kim, Note, Are Asians
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among others, and those of mixed races. 230 In Korea too, with the
formal classes abolished, the lines of demarcation are not clear. The
multiple factors of educational achievement, family background and
economic wealth contributing to one's social status makes more
difficult the determination of one's rank. In contemporary Korean
society, "[i]nteresting contrasts in social status abound. A selfemployed street vendor . . .may have a lower social status but earn
more than a better educated teacher or a civil servant .... [A] selfemployed butcher shop owner may have a lower social status than a
daily laborer .
*.".."231
If indeed wealth has becoming an increasing
factor in assessing status, it is difficult to distinguish between upper
class and middle class consumption patterns. 232 The blurring of the
strict lines between races in the United States and classes in Korea
presents another parallel.
Although determinations of race and social status are not as
clear in previous centuries, race in the United States and social
status in Korea continue to matter today. In the U.S. setting, some
commentators note that race not only matters and matters a great
deal, but that race has become so all encompassing that it affects
directly all aspects of life. 233 Or as Professor Ian Haney Lopez
234
explains, "Race dominates our personal lives":
It manifests itself in our speech, dance, neighbors, and friends--"our
very ways of talking, walking, eating and dreaming are ineluctably
shaped by notions of race." ... Race determines our economic prospects.
The race-conscious market screens and selects us for manual jobs and
professional careers, red-lines financing for real estate, green-lines our
access to insurance, and even raises the price of that car we need to
buy. Race permeates our politics. It alters electoral boundaries, shapes
the disbursement of local, state, and federal funds, fuels the creation
and collapse of political alliances, and twists the conduct of law
235
enforcement. In short, race mediates every aspect of our lives.

In the text above, replacing "race" with "social status" and directing
the statement far east to the Korean setting would produce an
equally vivid and applicable statement, given status consciousness in
Korean society. 236 To be sure, there are commentators who question

Black?: The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the ContemporarySignificance of
the Black/White Paradigm,108 YALE L.J. 2385 (1999).
230.
See generally Tanya Kateri Hernndez, "Multiracial"Discourse: Racial
Classificationsin an Era of Color-blindJurisprudence,57 MD. L. REV. 97 (1998).
231.
Robinson, supra note 4, at 512.
232.
See LETT,supra note 17, at 218-19.
233.
See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformationand Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988).

234.
235.
236.

Haney Lopez, supra note 77, at 3.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 7-13, 23-30, 66-71. See also Debby Abe,

Korean Americans Strive To Hold Generations Together, TACOMA NEWS TRIB., Jan. 8,
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whether race is the all pervasive matter in U.S. society that others
say it is, 2 3 7 and others who may ask whether economics rather than
race alone should be examined as the cause for the differences in
society. 238 In response to the latter, those advancing race as the
primary mediator could note that race and economics are closely
linked. This type of discussion may well have a counterpart across the
Pacific. That is, there may well be arguments to the effect that
despite the class system in the Chosun dynasty, social status in
contemporary Korea is not as impacting as some say it is, or as is
described above, or that in the age of democratization and capitalism,
the discussion should focus more on the economic cause for class
239
differentiation and not social status statically.
In the United States, the impact of race in societal interactions
and individual opportunities, among other factors, has given rise to
"passing." According to Professor Alex Johnson, passing "refers to a
situation where a black individual, due to her light pigmentation,
appears white and therefore may 'pass' for white in American society
despite the 'one drop' rule. '240 History shows that there have been
sharply negative responses by whites to passing. 241 Passing has
appeared in Korean society, in Korean forms, in the traditional and
modern setting. In the Chosun years, one's social status was visible,

1995, at B1, available at 1995 WL 5345894 (noting that in hierarchical Korea "status
dictates interaction in every social setting from family to business").
237.
See generally, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA
IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997); Chen, supra note 85.
238.
Alex M. Johnson, Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on Insights
Gleaned from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 887, 896 (1996).
239.
Let this discussion begin.
240.
Johnson, supra note 238, at 919 n.125. Others would require some culpability
for an act of passing. See Herndndez, supra note 230, at 123 ("Passing refers to an
individual's 'decision' to rely upon his or her light skin and European features in order to
assume the life and privilege of a White person secretly"). Professor Randall Kennedy
writes:
Passing is a deception that enables a person to adopt certain roles or identities
from which he would be barred by prevailing social standards in the absence of
his misleading conduct .... A passer is distinguishable from the person who is
merely mistaken-the person who, having been told that he is white, thinks of
himself as white, and holds himself out to be white (though he and everyone
else in the locale would deem him to be 'black' were the facts of his ancestry
known).
Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing,62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2001).
241.
Kennedy, supra note 240, at 1157 ("Segregationists condemned white
Negro passers as an insidious danger that threatened the very foundations of the
nation. Such people, it was feared, might contaminate white bloodlines by marrying
unsuspecting Caucasians. According to Professor Joel Williamson, 'Southern whites in
the early twentieth century became paranoid about invisible blackness'."). Kennedy
notes that "[tihe most thoroughgoing effort in American history to prevent and punish
passing emerged in Virginia in the 1920s with the birth of the Anglo Saxon Clubs of
America." Id.
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not only by the type of name tags that were required depending on
one's class, 242 but also by body language.2 43 To prevent the passing of
a member of the lower class by falsifying his birth in order to take the
civil service examination, every applicant was required to list the
244
names of the previous eight generations of his parents' families.
Toward the end of the Chosun dynasty, persons of lower classes
would pass themselves off as members of the upper class by assuming
245
surnames of dignity and "buying" nobility, presumably by bribery.
In contemporary Korea, even with the class structure long abolished,
given the high status consciousness, "all Koreans identify themselves
with the lineages of yangban scholar-officials. '24 6 Although such
claims may not meet the technical requirements of passing, at least
some of those who claim yangban ancestry might be guilty of willful
247
ignorance.
Another parallel between race and social status is the degree to
which race and status consciousness have become issues of serious
concern for the respective societies. The United States is at least in
part defined by race; 248 the pursuit of social status largely defines
Korean society. 249 In the United States and Korea, race and social
status, respectively, have become a problem. Commentators stateside

242.
See CLIFFORD, supra note 30, at 22 ("Beginning in 1413, virtually every
Korean had to wear name tags, which were permanent, graded badges with an
identification number and personal information. The highest officials wore ivory tags.
Outcasts and slaves wore large square wooden ones.").
243.

See CUMINGS, supra note 46, at 56.

244.
See HAHM, supra note 37, at 111 n.5.
245.
See Yong-shik Choe, Surnames: Microcosmic Icon of Confucian Order,
KOREA HERALD, Mar. 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 8116705 (quoting Korean
anthropologist, "Under the strict social hierarchy in which only influential families
were treated with respect, people of lower social classes may have wanted to cover up
their backgrounds by adopting noble family names," and noting that "[t]oward the end
of the dynasty, a growing number of affluent commoners and entrepreneurs, who
belonged to the lower echelons of the social hierarchy, secretly bought the status of
nobility and adopted 'dignitary' yangban surnames").
246.
Fujiya Kawashima, The Way of the Sonbi: Local Yangban and the Korean
Intellectual Tradition, 10 KOREAN CULTURE 4, 15 (1989), quoted in LETT, supra note 17,
at 13. Similarly, Lett notes that "[tihe pressure is so strong to make the claim that one
has yangban ancestry that most South Koreans do." LETT, supra note 17, at 40.
Robinson explains that the "social upheavals caused by the Japanese occupationcombined with the Korean War in which millions of Koreans were displaced and
separated from their families-made social lines more difficult to delineate. As a result,
claims of yangban status increased as such assertions become both easier to make and
more difficult to prove." Robinson, supra note 4, at 512.
247.
Kawashima, supra note 246, at 13. For those who accurately identify
themselves as yangban (however they can confirm such status) it may be a matter of
discomfort to see their standing diluted by seeing so many others stake the same claim.
248.
Reginald Leamon Robinson, White Cultural Matrix and the Language of
Nonverbal Advertising in Housing Segregation: Toward an Aggregate Theory of
Liability, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 101, 121 (1996) ("[V]irtually every aspect of American life
has been defined in terms of race ... ").
249.
See LETT, supra note 17, at 41, 206.
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have declared that race is the "most American of problems," 250 "the
overriding American problem," ' 25 1 "the most serious, the most
'252
divisive, and the most persistent problem in the United States.
Korea observers note that the confrontation between social classes
(along with that between provincial regions, and between North and
South Korea) has reached "crisis" proportions,253 and that "class
disparity has become a social time bomb. '254 As a result, race in the
United States and social status in Korea are both sensitive
subjects, 25 5 difficult to discuss candidly. The rules of political
256
correctness guides, restricts, and limits discussion on each.
The parallel between race and law in the United States and
social status and law in Korea is rather easy to draw and is offered
here simply in the form of a historical review. For centuries, there
was the separation of the races in the United States and of the social
classes in Korea, mandated by law. During this time, black slaves and
their descendants in the United States and non-yangban and their
descendants in Korea had their respective place in society, detached
from the upper class. This division was followed by (for lack of a
better term) domestic turmoil, lasting for some years-the Civil War
in the United States and Japanese colonial rule in Korea 25 7-the
conclusion of which brought formal liberation, an end to legal
separation, and new law that provided for equality of all races
stateside and all classes in Korea. 258 On the U.S. side, such legal
"equality" came into question in light of the decades of the separate
but equal doctrine formally approved by Plessy v. Ferguson.259 Nearly
six decades after Plessy came the "victory" of Brown v. Board of

250.

David B. Wilkins, Introduction to K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN,

COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 3 (1996).

251.

Jeffrey J. Mayer, Individual Moral Responsibility and the Criminalization

of Youth Gangs, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 984 (1993).

252.

J. Skelly Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47

U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 214 (1980).

253.
South Korea-Roh Asked To Bring National Unity, supra note 13.
254.
Deans, supra note 13, at A04.
255.
See LETT, supra note 17, at 40 ("Koreans' attitudes toward their yangban
heritage are very ambiguous, and the complex of subjective attitudes creates a tension
among the people."); Kevin Sack & Janet Elder, Poll Finds Optimistic Outlook but
Enduring Racial Division, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at Al (reporting "complex
tensions" in U.S. society on matters of race, and racial divide that is still "stubbornly
enduring").
256.
See LETT, supra note 17, at 40; Watch What You Say-Thought Police A
GatheringStorm Over the 'PoliticallyCorrect,'NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990, at 48.
257.
Korea observers may think more apt the domestic turmoil of the 1980s that
eventually led to the constitutional reforms of 1987.
258.
The new law came in the form of the Reconstruction Amendments in the
U.S. Constitution, and Article 8 (now 11) of the new Korean Constitution in South
Korea.
259.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Education2 60 made hollow by years of resistance to integration. The
decades following Brown sowed the seeds of what became the critical
race theory movement. 2 6 1 This movement in U.S. legal thought
provides the opportunity for discussion of another parallel between
law and race in the United States, and law and social status in Korea,
namely, that of a possible critical status theory.

IV.

THINKING CRITICALLY ABOUT SOCIAL STATUS AND LAW IN KOREA

A. CriticalRace International
A brief primer on critical race theory will provide the necessary
background. The critical race movement began in the 1970s,262
stemming in significant part from dissatisfaction with traditional
liberalism's approach to civil rights, which relies on the universalist
principle of the "rule of law" and premises of "formal equality" to
263
protect blacks from continued discrimination and subjugation.
Critical race theorists assert that much of U.S. law, specifically antidiscrimination law, is "structured to maintain white privilege," and
that "[n]eutrality and objectivity are ... harmful fictions that obscure
2 64
Put
the normative supremacy of whiteness in American society."
another way, the theory posits that law, under the guise of equality
and detached, impartial rules,2 65 actually "conceal[s] the partisan
exercise of power,"2 66 and acts as "an instrument of subordination and
an agent for silencing minority voices. '2 67 This critique of the

260.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

261.

See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN

INTRODUCTION 3-4 (2001); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE xiii (Richard
Delgado ed., 1995).
262.
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 261, at 3-4; CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 261, at xiii. There was the view at the time that "the
civil rights movement of the 1960s had stalled, that, indeed, many of its gains were
being rolled back." Id.
263.
Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and ConstitutionalLaw, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1277, 1282 n.23 (1993). Initially, critical race theory was a matter of white
domination and black oppression. The movement has since included other minority
groups, including Latino/as (LatCrit theory) and Asian Americans (Asian American
legal jurisprudence).
264.
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, supra note 78.
265.
Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 741, 745 (1993).
266.
D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial
Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437, 443 (1993).
267.
Monica J. Evans, Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw Culture and the
Rhetoric of Rights, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 263, 269 n.12 (1993); see Derrick Bell,
Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 369 (1992); Delgado, supra note 265, at 745. In
this regard, critical race theory (like feminist legal theory) takes its theoretical
underpinnings from the critical legal studies movement. Critical race theory borrows
from critical legal studies "its skepticism of law as science, its questioning whether text
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traditional, liberal approach to civil rights is one of the basic common
themes of critical race theory. 268 Another is the notion that racism is
normal and ordinary in U.S. society, and ingrained in the sociolegal
culture. 269 Initially a fledgling enterprise, the critical race theory
movement has since become an established discipline within the legal
academy, with a substantial bibliography, 270 including articles in the
most prestigious law reviews, 271 law school courses, 272 and periodic
conferences. 273 Another reality of critical race theory is that it
continues to be a controversial field within the legal academy and
legal scholarship. 2 74 This understanding of the key characteristics of
critical race theory provides a blueprint for a discussion of the
possibility of a similar critical theory thinking in Korea, in which
status differentiation there would take the part of the racial divide
stateside. It is a continuation of the discussion of parallels between
race and law, and social status and law.
B. Toward a Critical Status Theory
In brief, a critical status theory would advance the case that
Korean law, under the guise of equality and neutrality, perpetuates
differences between those of higher and lower social status,
continuing to subordinate the interests of the latter. Such a theory,

contains one right meaning, and its distrust of law's neutral and objective facade." Id.
at 744 (footnotes and citations omitted).
268.
Delgado, supra note 265, at 745.
269.
See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 261, at xiv. A
third theme is what has been described as the "interest-convergence" idea, which posits
that "white elites will tolerate or encourage racial advances for blacks only when they
also promote white self-interest." Id. This convergence theme was first advanced by
Professor Derrick Bell. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). Other common themes of
critical race theory scholarship are described in Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
CriticalRace Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461, 462-63 (1993).
270.
The standard texts are CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra
note 261; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
(Kimberl W. Crenshaw et al. eds., 1996); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, supranote 78.
271.
See e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 269.
272.
See Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1215, 1216 n.2 (2002) ("Over twenty American law schools offer courses in Critical
Race Theory or include Critical Race Theory as a central part of other courses."). UCLA
School of Law offers Critical Race Studies as a study of concentration. Id.
273.
Id.
274.
E.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) (describing critical race theorists
as part of "radical multiculturalists," and questioning their scholarship); Randall L.
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989)
(questioning whether critical race writings meet sufficient academic rigor and present
distinctive form of scholarship); Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 13, 1997, at 40 (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra, and describing critical race
theory as "lunatic fringe" of legal academy).
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as further elaborated below, would criticize the notions of the rule of
law and formal, textual equality; remind that Korean recognition of
divisions based on status is sharp, normal, ordinary, and deeply
rooted; and suggest briefly that in Korea, rights for those with lower
status are allowed only when they also serve the interests of those
with higher status or benefit those already with status. Ultimately,
this Part will conclude that there is ample support in the Korean
setting for a critical theory movement in principle, especially in the
area of education. 275 The discussion ends with thoughts on the
practical likelihood of such a movement taking place.
1. Critique of universal neutral principles
The critical race theory movement largely disputes that "neutral"
principles of law can ever effect equality in U.S. society. The
commentary indicates that the Korean setting raises questions about
a far more basic and fundamental matter-whether law generally
receives respect and has a meaningful presence in society. In a now
famous work, the late Korean legal scholar Professor Pyong-Choon
Hahm wrote in 1967 that, as a result of Korea's "cultural
background[] and historical tradition[ ]," law "is not the product of
the people's way of life," Koreans "do not have 'a valuable heritage of
legality' to be proud of,"2 76 and "'the rule of law' has never been a
desirable goal of politics in Korea. '277 Professor Hahm indicated that
during the centuries of rule by kings and royal families in the Chosun
and previous dynasties,
The idea that an ordinary subject may look to the law for the protection
of his freedom and liberty never even occurred to a Korean. The idea
was totally alien to his way of thinking. It was conceptually impossible.
The law was an antinomy or an antonym of freedom. Freedom vitiated
2 78
the law, and vice versa.

Other commentators have noted that there was contempt for law in
the Chosun dynasty, 279 and when law was applied, it was with a
sense of "particularistic justice, which took into account an

275.
This Article does not attempt a comprehensive review of all areas of Korean
law, nor does it suggest that all of Korean law, practice, and policy is susceptible to
attack under critical theory analysis. The area of education is selected both because of
the importance of education in Korean life and the deep status consciousness in
education-related activities.
276.
HAHM, supra note 37, at 207.
277.
Id. at 21.
278.
Id. at 208.
279.

(1990).

DAE-Kyu YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 19
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individual's relative position in society and circumstances. '28 0 With
this backdrop, "the upper class saw the law as a convenient tool to
perpetuate their status and privileges," while "the vast majority of
the people viewed the law as a means of oppression[ ]."281 The
popularly held view of law as an instrument of oppression continued
and worsened through the twentieth century when law became
equated with Japanese rule. 28 2 Because the Japanese legal code was
imposed by a foreign power to satisfy the goals of colonial rule, it had
no relation to Korean traditions and social norms, and therefore, law
was seen as "odious ' 28 3 and "distasteful. '284 Law benefited only
Japanese citizens who were exempt from many of the regulations,
and perhaps those Koreans who were loyal to Japan. 285 Even when
Korea won liberation from Japan, law continued its role as an
instrument imposed by a foreign occupier, this time, the U.S.
military. 28 6 Although the various new legal rules imposed by
USAMGIK were "[w]ith the best of intention," they "simply reinforced
unintentionally the continuing concept of law as one imposed from
above (and from without) and unresponsive to local needs." 28 7 Even
after an independent Korean government was established in 1948,
the authoritarian practices of Korea's first president, along with the
"obvious and continuous violations of the Constitution" 28 8 in the first
dozen years of the republic, merely reinforced the attitude that "law
28 9
was for the privileged to use against the masses of population.
This view continued to the late 1980s when the presidency was by
military dictatorship, and law was used to legitimize the governing

280.
Kim, supra note 70, at 6. Similarly, Professor Yoon has noted, "Being a
society based on status where inequality was the rule, it was only natural that law was
applied on a discriminatory basis." YOON, supra note 279, at 17.
281.

Kim, supra note 70, at 6-7.

282.

Id. at 7.

283.
HAHM, supra note 37, at 212.
284.
David I. Steinberg, Law, Development and Korean Society, 13 KOREANA Q.
43, 55 (1971), reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA,

supra note 2, at 47, 53. Indeed, for that reason, breaking the law, showing disrespect
for the rules, and flaunting legal authority was an act of Korean patriotism. See HAHM,
supra note 37, at 212; Kim, supra note 70, at 7; Steinberg, supra, at 55, reprinted in
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA, supra note 2, at 53.

285.
286.
287.

Kim, supra note 70, at 7.
Id. at 8.
Steinberg, supra note 284, at 56, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW

AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA, supra note 2, at 53-54.
288.
Id. at 57, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN

KOREA, supra note 2, at 54.
289.

Id. at 56, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF

KOREA, supra note 2, at 54. "Even Dr. [Chin-O] Yu," the primary draftsman of the
Korean Constitution, "became critical of [the Constitution's] ability protect the
individual because of the lack of a democratic legal tradition in Korea." Id. at 57,
reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA, supra note 2, at

55 (citing Yu, Ideal and Reality, supra note 139)).
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regime and prolong power in office. 290 Indeed, for the first forty years
of the republic, the Constitution was revised to satisfy the ends of
291
those in power.
One commentator has noted the "widespread feeling of the
irrelevance of the role that law plays in the developmental or
governmental processes," 292 even contending that "[l]aw as an
impartial arbiter, a universally applied rational standard, has never
gained credence in Korea."293 Given the deeply rooted attitudes of law
based on the culture and history of Korea, the pessimism in the
prospects for changing the views toward the rule of law is
understandable. Professor Hahm wrote in 1967: "It is . . . no easy

matter to change an attitude of several thousand years of history.
Such an attitude cannot be altered or re-adjusted by a few decades of
so-called modern life. Under these circumstances, one is inclined to
abandon the whole effort as impossible or futile. '294 Just four years
later, another commentator was not as despairing, but not much
more optimistic, noting that whether law in Korea can assume the
is
function of a neutral, rational standard "in the more distant future
295
unclear, but it is most unlikely that it can in the next generation."
It should be noted however, that many of the bleak forecasts for
the rule of law taking hold in Korea29 6 were made before the profound

290.
Steinberg, supra note 284, at 57, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA, supra note 2, at 55 (citing Yu, Ideal and Reality, supra
note 139)).
For a discussion of the specific amendments to the Constitution during
291.
these years, see YOON, supranote 279, at 96-105.
292.
Steinberg, supra note 284, at 62, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA, supra note 2, at 58.
Id. at 74, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN
293.
KOREA, supra note 2, at 67.
294.
HAHM, supra note 37, at 212.
295.
Steinberg, supra note 284, at 74, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA, supra note 2, at 67-68.
Professor Hahm's cultural approach to law has come under some criticism.
296.
See Shaw, supra note 59, at 2-4, 19 (questioning "culture model" "blood-and-soil
relativism weighted in favor of the past"); see also YOON, supra note 279, at 32-35
(critiquing "cultural determinism"). Shaw questions Hahm's conclusions and their
applicability in the contemporary setting:
Professor Hahm . . . cited a variety of Chinese sources, often from remote
antiquity (and sometimes out of context), but did not discuss how individual
Korean thinkers during the last traditional dynasty (from 1392 to 1910)
interpreted these sources. He also failed to mention, much less analyze, a
single traditional Korean source of law, legal commentary, or case book....
Most important, Hahm fails to note the degree to which Confucianism was
discredited as political philosophy among twentieth-century Korean thinkers
and political activists. He also neglected the diversity of modern Korean values,
including those of the legal profession.
...Hahm's [work] clearly remains captive to the notion of static, timeless
characteristics of Korean society. His "Korean social order" never seems to
change, despite changes in economy and social structure. Consequently, one
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constitutional, political, and legal reforms of 1987, which resulted from
mass demonstrations and civil unrest.297 That year began a period that
saw increased democratization, 298 rapid economic growth and
prosperity, and perhaps changes in societal attitudes, to a degree that
Hahm and other commentators could not have imagined in previous
years. Korea's efforts to become "an active participant in world
affairs" 29 9 by necessity require some attention to, and compliance with,
internationally accepted legal rules and norms. Domestically, economic
prosperity has led to the emergence of a new middle class, 300 and
Korean society, long one of hierarchy and vertical structure, has taken
on a more horizontal structure. 30 1 Capitalism has led to "calls for
individual freedom and private initiative," 30 2 and contributed to
constitutionalism; the growing numbers of the middle class see "the
legal system as a means of protecting and maintaining their status and
wealth. '30 3 Dr. Chan Jin Kim, a former National Assemblyman, notes
that such changes have brought the "dissolution" of many traditional
Korean values, and concludes, "New values have now risen to take the
place of many of Korea's discarded traditions. Emerging values in
modern Korean society are far more compatible with the rule of
law. ' 30 4 It may well be true that political and economic developments
in the past two decades have led to "[g]reat progress .. .in improving
Korean attitudes towards law. ' 30 5
Yet, in spite of these
developments-all of them a substantial departure from life under
Japanese colonial rule, not to mention the ways of the Chosun
society-there is still some ambivalence, as a result of the long social
history and long-held beliefs that Professor Hahm and others have
emphasized. 30 6 Even Dr. Kim's optimism is tempered with the

model fits all periods of Korean history, and may equally well explain Korea
hundreds of years ago, today, and tomorrow.
Shaw, supra note 59, at 3-4.
297.
The constitutional amendment in 1987 was the only of the several revisions
of the text implemented as a result of public protest and opposition. See YOON, supra
note 279, at 105-06.
298.
In 1987, Korea saw its first president elected directly by the public,
followed by, in subsequent elections, the first civilian to be elected (in 1992), and then
the first candidate of the opposition party to be elected (in 1997).
299.
Kim, supra note 70, at 1.
300.
See YOON, supra note 279, at 218; Kim, supra note 70, at 18-19.
301.
See Kim, supra note 70, at 4.
302.
YOON, supra note 279, at viii.
303.
Kim, supra note 70, at 20.
304.
Id. at 1-2.
305.
Id. at 1.
306.
Professor Yoon's passage below, which appears to be a description for
contemporary Korea, indicates the lasting impact of the Confucian norms on presentday law.
In homogeneous societies like Korea, social norms, such as morals, mores, and
religion, become more effective means of social control and integration than
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realization that "the current state of legal consciousness of the Korean
people remains a major obstacle to overcome in the course of
democratization. Lack of respect for the law presents an enormous
barrier to social change and advancement in Korea. '30 7 Perhaps the
words of Professor Dae-Kyu Yoon just three years after the 1987
reforms accurately capture the past, present, and future of the role of
law in Korea, when he expressed the 'hopeful assumption that law can
be made an instrument for social change rather than for manipulating
and maintaining the status quo," and looked to a brighter political
future "in view of the social changes which have taken place since
World War II."'308 Still, he wrote, the realization of the rule of law in
Korea may be a "stupendous task."30 9
What is the critical status theorist to make of this discussion of
the "prospects" for the rule of law in Korea? To put it bluntly, it would
be nothing short of an intellectual feast. 310 If the task for the critical
race theorist stateside is to support the argument that liberalism's
approach to equality under neutral principles of law is faulty, the
Korean counterpart could present an a fortiori case: the basic rule of
law, not to mention the formal rules of equality, is lacking in Korea.
The critical status theorist may rely on what appears to be
overwhelming evidence. It has been said that the legal history of
Korea is such that for centuries, up to the middle of the twentieth
century, law was designed to favor those of privilege, status, and
rank. 3 11 "Confucianism established the precedent of preferential legal

law. The reason for this is that such norms emerge organically from the social
milieu and do not require state coercion. In such societies, the role of law is
generally muted. In Confucian hierarchicaland centralized society, inequality
is based on, and justified by, status. Private law tends to operate peripherally,
and public administration is conducted by orders or directives instead of
permanent rules.
Yoon, supra note 3, at 396, 397 (emphasis added).
307.
Kim, supra note 70, at 2. Dr. Kim notes:
It is not uncommon to encounter pedestrians disregarding a crosswalk sign or
littering on the street. Traffic regulations are so commonly violated that many
foreigners are reluctant to drive in Korea. When individuals are accused of
violations of petty regulations, they may argue with the police and ask, "why in
the world do you pick me up, while leaving so many violators unpunished?"

Id.
308.
YOON, supra note 279, at vii.
Id. at 200.
309.
310.
The Korean setting must be the stuff of dreams for the critical legal
theorist. Few other societies would possess a better tailored sociolegal history more
vulnerable to the critical theorist's task of challenging liberalism's approach to
equality.
311.
Kim, supra note 70, at 6-7.
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treatment in accordance with one's social status. '3 12 Law was seen as
an instrument of exploitation and oppression of the masses. 313 As a
result of these centuries-old attitudes, reinforced periodically with
blunt force, terms like "freedom" and "equality" were "devoid of
content until recently" and are still "unfamiliar to Koreans" and not
fully understood. 3 14 In what must strike as cumulative evidence,
there are the explicit statements that in Korea, "[t]he law and legal
institutions have generally supported the status quo; '315 and "[t]he
trouble with Korea lies in the fact that Koreans have yet to make the
rule-of-law a working reality. '316 Given this background, the critical
status theorist may advance the case that the Korean Constitution's
mandate of equality for all persons before the law and prohibition of
discrimination based on social status are precisely the formal
premises of equality that have not been delivered.
The critical status theorist will not likely be dissuaded by the
democratization reforms of 1987 or the establishment of the Korean
Constitutional Court. At the time, the Constitutional Court became
the "most active" judicial body in Korean history and showing "its
readiness to acknowledge the unconstitutionality" of government
action. 317 Yet the customs and practices of the Court in its first two

312.
Id.; see id. at 5 ("Preference and privilege in the Yi dynasty were commonly
granted along class lines, with social and legal expectations differing according to one's
rank in society.").
313.
YOON, supranote 279, at 200.
314.
Kim, supra note 70, at 11.
315.
Steinberg, supra note 284, at 74, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA, supra note 2, at 68. Steinberg elaborated (in 1971) that
none of the legal institutions in Korea have assumed a "progressive function":
The legal profession has never acted as a vital or experimental body
determined to improve the understanding or administration of law or the
distribution of justice. Legal education and legal educators have never been
innovative in either training the professions or in providing new frontiers to the
civil service in spite of the pivotal role of law in the training of executives or in
the management of government. Neither the courts nor the National Assembly
have [sic] provided a marked balance to the power of the Korean Executive
Branch. The courts have generally been responsive to executive pressure, and
the National Assembly on both sides of the aisle has often performed in what
can only be termed an extra-legal manner.
Id. at 74-75, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA,

supra note 2, at 68.
316.
YOON, supra note 279, at viii.
317.
Id. at 170. For a discussion of the origins of the Constitutional Court, its
failed predecessors, and its outlook in the opening years, see id. at 168-70; James M.
West & Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea:
Transforming the Jurisprudenceof the Vortex?, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 73 (1990). A more
recent work that chronicles the first 15 years of the Court's work, and that also offers a
comparative profile (in relation to other constitutional courts in Asia), is Tom
Ginsburg, Rule by Law or Rule of Law? The Constitutional Court of Korea, in JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 206 (Tom

Ginsburg ed., 2003).
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decades of operations would give the critical theorist the opportunity
to argue that there are institutional barriers toward achieving
equality, further challenging the notion of impartial, judicial
tribunals that give life to the formal rule of equality. The matter of
the Court's standard of review is one example. Those trained in U.S.
law are accustomed to approaching cases relating to equal protection
under the labels of impermissible classifications and standards of
review, with the most heightened review (the rather imposing "strict
scrutiny") for cases that grant benefits or impose burdens based on
318
suspect classifications like race, national origin, and alienage.
Korean constitutional law is not as developed. The critical status
theorist will likely make much of one commentator's observation that
in Korea, "[a]ll legislative classifications are dealt with under a single
standard. The concepts of 'suspect' or 'semi-suspect' classifications
have yet to be imported, '319 and that for many years, the courts "have
enunciated only one standard of review . . . [the] 'reasonable test,"
which "parallels the deferential, traditional American 'rational basis
test.' 320 A singular classification and the rational basis test are
suspicious to the critical theorist, since they can be used to uphold
easily the constitutionality of measures that discriminate;
classifications based on "social status" would receive no special
attention, and its explicit inclusion in the equal protection provision
would be rather meaningless. The response to this argument is that
there has been progress and development in recent years. In 1999,
the Constitutional Court specifically declared that one of two
standards of review is to be applied, depending on the nature of the
case. 32 1 The "reasonable test"322 would be applied in a large number

318.
See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985). In City of Cleburne, the Court stated that race, alienage, and national origin
are:
[So seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that
laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy.... For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to
be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict
scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.
Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971)).
319.
Ahn, supra note 3, at 101.
320.
Id.
321.
98 Hun-Mah 363, Dec. 23, 1999. The case is discussed infra note 325. The
Court had referred to the two tests in previous cases, but had not previously indicated
which test should be applied in what circumstances.
322.
The Korean term for this test is jeh-eui-geum-ji won-chik, meaning roughly,
"anti-arbitrary principle," and which requires "treating the like equally, and the unlike
unequally." 90 Hon-Kah 97, May 13, 1991, quoted in Ahn, supra note 3, at 101 n.168.
See also CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE KOREAN

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (1988-1998) 126 (2001).
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of cases, but the more heightened "balancing test"3 23 would be applied
in cases that allege violations of fundamental rights provided for in
the Constitution or discrimination based on grounds explicitly stated
in the Constitution. 24 To this development, the critical status
theorist will counter by noting that the Constitutional Court has
applied the balancing test unevenly, leading to inconsistent
results.3 25 Moreover, as another commentator notes, it is not always
32 6
clear what standard the Court is applying or why it is doing so.
This is part of a general frustration expressed by Court observers

323.
Roughly meaning "proportionality principle" (bib-neh-won-chik), the
balancing test would require consideration of (1) the legitimacy of government purpose;
the propriety of the government measure; (3) the degree of infringement on the
individual or the degree of restriction of the measure; and (4) the balancing of the
government interests and individual rights. See KWON, supra note 192, at 338-40;
Myung-Woong Lee, Bi-reh-eui won-chik-gwa pahl-leh-eui nohn-jeung-bahng-bub
[Balancing Test and Demonstration Method in Case Law], 9 HUN-BUB-NOHN-CHONG
[COLLECTION

OF

TREATISES

ON

THE

CONSTITUTION]

671,

673

(1998),

at

http://www.ccourt.go.kr/library/documaterial02.asp.
324.
Thus, presumably, the heightened standard would be applied to cases
involving classifications based on sex, social status and religion, S. KOREA CONST. art.
11(1), and also those alleging violation of, among others, the "freedom of occupation,"
id. art. 15; privacy, id. arts. 17, 18; "freedom of conscience," id. art. 19; "freedom of
religion," id art. 20; "freedom of speech and the press" and "freedom of assembly and
association," id. art. 21.
325.
One case involved a government regulation giving additional points on civil
service examinations to military veterans. 98 Hun-Mah 363, Dec. 23, 1999. An English
translation of the opinion is available in CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, DECISIONS
OF THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (1998.9 - 1999.12) 32 (2001), at
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/english/decision02.htm. Korea has compulsory military service
for all males, with some exemptions allowed. The female plaintiffs argued that the
measure was impermissible discrimination based on sex, since women are not required
to serve in the military and many women do not. Id. The Court applied the heightened
standard of review, even referring to "strict scrutiny," and held that the preferential
point system was unconstitutional. Id. at 45, 46.
Another case also involved a preferential policy for civil service examinations, this
time given to guk-gah-yu-gong-jah, or roughly, "men of national merit" and their
descendants. 2000 Hun-Mah 25, Feb. 22, 2000. Included within the "national merit"
category are, among others, those injured or killed in the defense of the country, and
those who fought against Japanese colonial rule. The Act on the Honorable Treatment
and Support of Persons of Distinguished Service to the State, art. 4, § 1. Normally,
these persons do not enjoy high social status. In its decision, the Court referred to the
heightened balancing test, but stated that a more relaxed standard of review would be
more appropriate in the case, but not necessarily the reasonable test. 2000 Hun-Mah
25, Feb. 22, 2000. The Court emphasized the service and sacrifice of the guk-ah-yugong- jah, and ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the preferential policy. Id.
One way to explain the apparent inconsistency between the above two cases is that
while giving additional points to all military veterans would lead to preferential
treatment of virtually half the population at the expense of the other half, preference to
guk-gah-yu-gong-jah would be to a small number of people, a point that the Court
specifically made. Id.
326.
Cho, supra note 168, at 13.
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concerning the lack of clarity in judicial decisions. 327 For the Korean
critical status theorist, this will smack of the "particularistic justice"
of traditional Korea and confirm suspicion that institutional practices
of broad discretion prevent the mandate of textual equality from
becoming a practical reality.
2. Ordinariness of Status Division
Critical race theory posits that "racism is normal, not aberrant,
in American society":
Because racism is an ingrained feature of our landscape, it looks
ordinary and natural to persons in the culture. Formal equal
opportunity-rules and laws that insist on treating blacks and whites
(for example) alike-can thus remedy only the more extreme and
shocking sorts of injustice, the ones that do stand out. Formal equality
can do little about the business-as-usual forms of racism that people of
color confront every day and that account for such misery, alienation,
328
and despair.

The critical status theorist in Korea may urge that applying the
statement to the Korean setting, and replacing race consciousness
with status consciousness and persons of color with persons of lower
status, would yield an equally apt and vivid statement. Critical status
theory would advance the view that status consciousness in Koreathe willingness and tendency to draw sharp lines and make
assumptions based on social status 329-is
normal, ordinary, and

327.

Professor Ahn laments the

[J]udicial tradition of not elaborating the ratio decidendi of decisions. In many
opinions the reasoning is based on a foregone conclusion. A typical ending may
go something like this: "The discrimination here is not unconstitutional
because it is not unreasonable." By American standards, opinions of Korean
courts fall short of full discussion on the legal arguments and issues raised and
sometimes jump to hasty conclusions. Further ambiguities arise from the new
judicial fashion of incorporating several constitutional provisions without
sorting out the core ingredients of each provision.
Ahn,supra note 3, at 103.
328.
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 261, at xiv.
329.
Some in critical race discourse have used "race" as a verb: 'To underscore
race as an activity rather than an objective category, I describe specific acts that have
the intent or effect of reinforcing racial relationships as 'race-ing."' Margaret (H. R.)
Chon, On the Need for Asian American Narratives in Law: Ethnic Specimens, Native
Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 4, 6 n.9 (1995). Professor
Kendall Thomas appears to be one of the first to propose this practice. Kendall
Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1805, 1806-07 & n.8 (1993) ("I have suggested in some of my work in critical race
theory that 'race' is a verb, that we are 'raced' through a constellation of practices that
construct and control racial subjectivities."). Perhaps this is one example of the "shared
vocabular[y]" that critical race theorists use in their scholarship. See generally
Margaret E. Montoya, Celebrating Racialized Legal Narratives, in CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, supra note 78. Others may question whether the genre has resorted to
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deeply rooted. The evidence from the available commentary is
revealing. Contemporary Koreans "look down upon those without
high social origins,"330 and "those higher up on the scale look[ ] down
on those below. '331 Elitist attitudes of Korea's middle and upper
classes include disdain and open contempt for blue-collar and manual
332
workers "and a refusal to associate with them on equal terms."
Like the yangban in the Chosun era, who determined that "soiling
their hands would irremediably diminish their social status," 333 the
contemporary middle and upper classes take pains to avoid
"participation in blue-collar work or manual labor lest they lose their
status."334 The striking testimony continues: "People without a
college education, including skilled workers with vocational school
backgrounds, often were treated as second-class citizens by their
white collar, college educated managers, despite the importance of
'335
their skills for economic development.
At this juncture, a discussion of how social status impacts on one
important segment of Korean life--education-will further highlight
the normal, ordinary, natural, and inherent nature of status
consciousness in Korean society. One will note a vicious circle at
work, with education and social status occupying the bipolar ends:
one's social status impacts one's educational opportunities, and
education is the single most important determinant of social status. A
society so structured all but assures that the status quo will continue
by perpetuating class reproduction.
As alluded to before, Professor James Robinson's study of the
Korean primary school setting indicates a strong correlation between
social status of the student's family and the student's academic

terms and phrasing whose meaning are known only to members. Since there appear to
be no equivalents to "racism" and "to race" in the social status discourse, the text
herein will refer to more conventional descriptions.
330.
LETT, supra note 17, at 40.
331.

Id. at 44.

332.
Id. at 208 (citing Carter Eckert, The South Korean Bourgeoisie: A Class in
Search of Hegemony, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA 95, 114 (Hagen
Koo ed., 1993)).
333.
CUMINGS, supra note 46, at 55; (1997); LETT, supra note 17, at 208.
334.
LETT, supra note 17, at 43 (noting that "[tihis avoidance of manual labor
has been termed by critics as the 3-D pyong, or '3-D disease,' '3-D' being the label that
Koreans have given to work that is dirty, dangerous, and difficult"); see also id. at 53
(describing manual labor as "anathema for members of families concerned with
status"); Yoon, supra note 35, at 21 ("Occupations such as ploughing or sweating with a
hammer in a factory were thought to be the work of the ignorant people, whereas,
educated college graduates could pursue government positions.").
335.
COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 33, at 116. "In the workplace, men and women
with a middle-school or secondary-school education are often treated with open
contempt by university graduate managers. The latter addresses [sic] them with rude
or abrupt words whose impact is amplified by the status-sensitive nature of the Korean
language." Id. at 99.
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achievement. 33 6 Students' interaction with teachers, opportunities for
learning and leadership, and even seating arrangements in the
classroom all depend on their families' social status. 337 Thus, the
system benefits those who assert status 338 and all but encourages
(perhaps even demands) them to assert it. Those with lower status
are powerless to effect their situation within this scheme. 339 Professor
Robinson's analysis of the impact of social status on educational
opportunities could easily be a chapter in an anthology of Korean
critical status theory. 340 He notes that beginning in 1960, the Korean
government had implemented reforms 341 in education "in an effort to

336.
See supra text accompanying notes 211-13. Professor Robinson includes
wealth (more specifically, the salary of the student's father) in assessing social status
in his study. Robinson, supra note 4, at 509. Economic wealth is especially important
for parents of schoolchildren in Korea in light of the practice of chon-ji, which is defined
as "a little token of one's gratitude; a small present." MINJUNG ESSENCE KOREANENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 94, at 2018. In the school setting, the most common
form of chon-ji is money in an envelope, but also includes material gifts. Teachers
"consider [chon-ji as] a reflection of the parents' concern." Robinson, supra note 4, at
516. The Korean media have reported that some teachers more than double their
salaries through chon.ji payments. See id. at 518 (citations omitted). Parents see "a
direct relationship between giving [chon-ji] and improving educational opportunities
for their children." Id. Parents are buying "a chance for their child to be a student
teacher, buying more opportunities for their child to be called on, and buying more
chances for them to receive extra attention in overcrowded classrooms. This attention
is purchased to improve the child' future and the family's claim to modern yangban
status." Id.
One commentator has noted that "[o]ne could argue persuasively that chonji is a
dysfunctional institution. Any social system, including South Korea's, is likely to
improve when teachers treat students equally and fairly, without regard to gifts."
Steven R. Salbu, Are ExtraterritorialRestrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable
InternationalPolicy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century?,
24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 235-36 (1999). Such a statement is notable for both its
unassailable content and the blind naivete of Korean society. The pursuit of social
status, the importance of education in determining status, and the impact of chon-ji on
one's chances are such that the practice has become routine.
337.
See Robinson, supra note 4, at 523.
338.
See LETT, supra note 17, at 214 (discussing Robinson, supra note 4).
339.
See COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 33, at 116.
340.
Thus, law need not be the exclusive site for critical status theory thought.
Critical status theory, like its U.S. counterpart, can have interdisciplinary interest.
Professors Delgado and Stefancic note that "[t]oday, many in the field of education
consider themselves critical race theorists who use [the theory's] ideas to understand
issues of school discipline and hierarchy, tacking, controversies over curriculum and
history, and IQ and achievement testing." DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 261, at 3
(emphasis added).
341.
These reforms include: a ban on parent teacher associations "as they had
become organizations that influential parents used to control teachers and schools
through extra payments to schools"; random enrollment in public and private middle
schools and high schools, which "effectively abolished an elitist educational system
stacked in favor of the wealthy"; rotation of teachers in public schools to "discourage
the type of close connections among teachers, schools, and students, that could lead to
corrupt practices"; a ban on in-school extra classes paid for by parents, which extended
the school day by four hours; and a ban on private instruction. Robinson, supra note 4,
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provide more egalitarian opportunities for all social groups" but
concludes that such reforms "have not penetrated the classroom
and... inequalities still prevail. 3 42 He states bluntly that although
reforms present an appearance of equality regardless of social status,
"equal opportunity in education is a goal that 30 years of educational
reform has yet to achieve. '3 43 Professor Robinson's references to
segregation in Korean schools present an easy parallel to race and
segregation in the pre- and post-Brown United States, which should
resonate with critical race theorists stateside: "In the past, the elite
school system[ 344 ] engendered social segregation. Now, segregation is
maintained within classrooms open to all. '3 45 In the end, Professor
Robinson cautions that the educational system continues the status
quo into the next generation, "with the children of each social stratum
taking the places of their parents as social demarcation are
maintained across generations. '346 The ordinariness of status
consciousness and division based on social status is inherent in the
educational system, which rewards those with status and encourages
them to assert it.
The critical status theorist will argue that status consciousness
and its ordinariness continue after school activities are complete.
Given the importance of education, many students in primary and
secondary schools receive private instruction after the class day ends,
at exam preparation schools or in other settings. 347 Again, this option
is available only to those with the economic or material means, or

at 513-14. The ban on private lessons, which was later rescinded and modified, is
discussed in more detail. See infra text accompanying notes 350-55.
342.
Id. at 506.
343.

Id. at 513.

344.
Robinson notes that the elitist system was "stacked in favor of the
wealthy," such that "close connections among teachers, schools, and students ... could
lead to corrupt practices." Id.
345.
Id. at 530.
346.
Id. at 528-29. Professor Robinson urges that "[i]f the schools mirror society,
then equal educational opportunity will only occur when differences in social status are
reduced," and that what is needed is a "a major structural overhaul to reduce the
educational scramble that monopolizes the energies and monies of parents and
children from elementary through secondary school." Id. at 529-30.
347.
A study conducted by the Korean Educational Development Institute
revealed that over half of all primary and secondary school students receive some form
of private lessons. Parents gave the following reasons for such extracurricular activity:
college admissions (58.2%), development of potential and talents (15.3%), "just because
others do it" (14.6%), and lack of time to instruct children themselves (6.3%). See 98
Hun-Kah 16, 98 Hun-Mah 429, Apr. 27, 2000 (Lee, J., dissenting). An English
translation of the opinion is available in CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, DECISIONS
OF

THE

KOREAN

CONSTITUTIONAL

COURT

(2000),

at

http://www.ccourt.go.kr/

english/decision01.htm ("ExtracurricularBan Case") [hereinafter ExtracurricularBan
Case].
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some position of influence. 348 Here, too, the Korean government, in an
effort to equalize educational opportunities, has implemented
reforms, and again, the reforms have failed. 349 In 1981, the new
government under former army general and self-appointed president
Doo-Hwan Chun implemented a law prohibiting virtually all private
instruction outside of regular instruction in schools. 350 Assuming
compliance, such a rule would better level the playing field, and not
deprive those students whose parents were without means to provide
for private lessons. In a modern example of societal disregard for the
rule of law, the statute banning private lessons was more famous for
351
its widespread breach than compliance.
The statute banning private instruction was ultimately revised,
with the ban to apply in a more narrow setting, permitting
instruction at private teaching institutes, instruction by relatives,
and instruction by college and graduate students. 352 Those with the
means to avail themselves of instruction by these means could stay
35 3
of
within the law. The main target of the statute was the giving
private lessons by elementary and secondary school teachers after
school hours. 35 4 In a decision that could give further ammunition to
the critical status theorist, the Constitutional Court struck down the
law. 355 The case arose when the operator of a profitable Internet site
that provided sample tests and answers to students was indicted for

348.
Koreans tend to rely on personal connections. "Typically, a Korean man will
try to figure out whom he knows in an organization (or whom he knows who knows
someone) rather than make a direct approach." CLIFFORD, supra note 30, at 11.
349.
See ExtracurricularBan Case, 98 Hun-Kah 16, 98 Hun-Mah 429, Apr. 27,
2000 (acknowledging many people disregarded government's attempt at banning extra
lessons).
350.
Act on Private Institutes (revised by Act No. 3433, Apr. 13, 1981). Lett
explains that such efforts sought to "ease the trend toward excessive out-of-school
study, both because it was responsible for unreasonable high education costs to parents
and because it put those who could not afford such lesson at a disadvantage." LETT,
supra note 17, at 175.
351.
The Constitutional Court acknowledged as much. Extracurricular Ban
Case, 98 Hun-Kah 16, 98 Hun-Mah 429, Apr. 27, 2000.
352.
Act on the Establishment and Operation of Private Teaching Institutes
(amended by Act No. 4964, Aug. 4, 1995). A violation of the statute was punishable by
imprisonment of not more than one year or a fine not exceeding 3 million Won
(approximately US$2,500). Id. art. 22(1).
353.
Technically, the statute prohibited only the giving of lessons, not receiving
them or arranging for them. ExtracurricularBan Case, 98 Hun-Kah 16, 98 Hun-Mah
429, Apr. 27, 2000.
354.
As a policy matter, there was some concern with school teachers
moonlighting by giving private lessons, since the extracurricular tutoring could affect
their primary teaching responsibilities in regular schools. There was also concern that
such private tutoring could jeopardize the integrity of the college entrance
examinations. Id.
355.
Id.
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violation of the law. 3 56 The majority of the Court decided that the
statute impermissibly restricted the rights of students, parents, and
those able to give lessons. 357 Applying the heightened balancing test
and emphasizing that the statute was not the "least restrictive
means" to achieve legislative ends, the majority ruled that the
limitations the law imposed were unconstitutional. 358 A "traditional"
or comparative discussion of the case could consider the main
competing interests at issue: the right of parents to educate their
children, on the one hand, versus the legislature's interest in
reducing the societal burdens of education-related expenses and
providing more egalitarian opportunity, regardless of social or
economic status, on the other. 359 Although such (and any) discussion
of the case should be welcome, within the contemplation of a possible
critical status theory movement, the Court's decision provides a
tantalizing opportunity to imagine how a critical status theorist
would approach the case, and to get inside the mind of such a thinker.
3. Critical Status Voice Attempted
What follows is an attempt at a critique of the Court's decision
concerning the ban on private instruction, from the view of a

356.
Neither the students who subscribed nor their parents were parties to the
action. Id.
357.
Id.
358.
Id. The Court has nine members. Six justices were in the majority. Two
justices filed "dissenting" opinions, both agreeing with the majority's conclusion that
the statute was unconstitutional, but preferring to keep the statute effective in form,
rather than immediately invalidating it. Id. (Han, J., dissenting; Chung, J.,
dissenting). Justice Young-Mo Lee also dissented, and would have upheld the
constitutionality of the statute. He criticized the majority's overruling the legislature's
discretion to accomplish substantive equality, and ignoring the public interest. Id. (Lee,
J., dissenting). A sharply worded "reply opinion" joined by five out of the six justices in
the majority noted that its decision did not declare all statutes limiting private
instruction to be unconstitutional; the reply opinion also stated that the statute in
question excessively restricts the "people's basic rights," and that it failed to "satisfy
the requirement of the least restrictive means and the balancing of interests." Id. (Kim
(Yong-Joon), Kim (Moon-Hee), Koh, Shin & Ha, JJ., reply op.). After the Court's
decision, the National Assembly revised the statute to include a reporting requirement
for those giving private lessons. Id. ("Aftermath of the Case").
359.
The former interest was seen in two decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925). The Meyer decision involved a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of
foreign languages in schools; the statute in Pierce required all students in Oregon to
attend public schools, with minor exemptions. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390-91; Pierce, 268
U.S. at 510-11. The Supreme Court held both statues unconstitutional, emphasizing
the constitutionally protected liberty right "to acquire useful knowledge . . . and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, and "the liberty of
parents . . . to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
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hypothetical critical status theorist. The text emulates the voice and
style taken by some critical race writers in U.S. legal academia and is
360
mindful of zealous advocacy.
To begin with, the statute placing limitations on private lessons that
was before the Constitutional Court was a much diluted and
eviscerated version of the ill-fated predecessor that prohibited
virtually all private instruction. The purpose of the original law was to
"minimize inequality in opportunity for private education."3 61 The
revised statute had all but recognized an educational hierarchy that
corresponded to social status and socioeconomic hierarchy in Korean
society, namely, those who were able to provide for private tutoring at
private teaching institutes or by college and graduate students, and
those who could not. 362 Thus, what the Court had before it was a
mere shell of the former statute that was driven by egalitarian desires.
Given the opportunity to uphold a small appearance of equality, the
Court instead chose to invalidate the law, further perpetuating class
division, worsening the plight of those with the lowest social status,
and confirming legal sanction of unequal social status.
There is judicial activism at work in the Court's decision. The Court
declares that the statute places impermissible restrictions on three
fundamental rights: the right of parents to educate children; the
students' right to pursue happiness; and the right of occupation of
those who wish to offer private tutoring services (at other than private
teaching institutes). 363 The right of parents to educate the children is
a product of the Court's convenience. Forced to acknowledge that such
a right is absent in the Constitution, the Court claims that it
nevertheless "arises out of' three other rights in the Constitution-the
"inviolable human rights concerning marriage and family life;" the
"right to pursue happiness;" and rights not enumerated in the
Constitution. 364 (If the United States Supreme Court can create new
365
rights from the "penumbra" and "emanations" of the Bill of Rights,

360.
The exercise is far from a frolic, and is not intended to be mocking. To
some, the text may read as an expression of critical thought in the Korean setting; to
others, it will be an equivalent of the pseudo-scholarship that some say is seen in
critical race writings. See, e.g, Posner, supra note 274, at 42-43 ("[The stories told by
the critical race theorists do not rise to the level of literature. They are flops as stories
and ... flops as scholarship"; "[T]he critical race theorists come across as whiners and
wolf-criers. By foreswearing analysis in favor of storytelling, they come across as labile
and intellectually limited").
361.
ExtracurricularBan Case, 98 Hun-Kah 16, 98 Hun-Mah 429, Apr. 27, 2000.
362.
In addition to the well known hierarchy of colleges in Korea, perhaps there
is also a hierarchy among college students who provide tutoring services. Students
from colleges in the first tier can and do charge more for their services than their
contemporaries in the lower tiers.
363.
ExtracurricularBan Case, 98 Hun-Kah 16, 98 Hun-Mah 429, Apr. 27, 2000.
364.
Id. (citing S. KOREA CONST. arts. 36(1), 10, 37(1)).
365.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (describing constitutional
right of privacy). There have been quotable criticisms of the decision. E.g., Raoul
Berger, Activist Censures of Robert Bork, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 993, 1013 (1991) ("as
vaporous a derivation as can be imagined"); David Crump, How Do the Courts Really
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why not the Constitutional Court?) The Court then stretches the
mercurial "right to pursue happiness" to include a student's right to
"free development of personality." 366 It is a remarkable leap of faith,
or social engineering gone awry, to think that si-uhm ji-ohk
(examination hell) contributes to the development of a student's
personality. Even the right of private tutors to peddle their servicesallowing them to prey on the fears and hopes of students and
parents-receives more recognition than the right of equality
regardless of social status. With these "basic rights" chosen as the
focus of the case, the statute has little chance under the Court's
aggressive application of the heightened balancing test, and the
sudden, overwhelming emphasis of the "least restrictive means"
367
requirement.
The Court seems little concerned about the impact of its decision, the
practical result of which is to favor those with the social and economic
means to provide private instruction, at the expense of those who
cannot. Only when the majority is reminded of this reality by Justice
Lee in dissent, does it choose to address it, then rejecting the dissent's
368
objections caustically and defensively, even accusing it of "bigotry."
The decision is especially disturbing in light of the Court's
acknowledgment, to its credit, of educational elitism in Korean society
as well as the decisive role that hahk-buhl plays in determining one's
social status and her place in the social structure. Justice Lee
correctly notes that academic background is perceived "to exercise far
more influence on [one's] employment, salaries and social status than
[her] merits." 369 Korea is still very much a society where social status

Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial
Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 795, 844 (1996) ("Justice Douglas's opinion
supports a result reached independently of its logic.").
366.
ExtracurricularBan Case, 98 Hun-Kah 16, 98 Hun-Mah 429, Apr. 27, 2000.
The right to free development of personality is seen in the German Constitution. F.R.G.
CONST. art. 2(1).
367.
See Lee, supra note 323.
368.
ExtracurricularBan Case, 98 Hun.Kah 16, 98 Hun-Mah 429, Apr. 27, 2000
(Kim (Yong-Joon), Kim (Moon-Hee), Koh, Shin & Ha, JJ., reply op.). The majority
characterized the dissent as dichotomizing "the socially and economically strong and
weak," "capitalism and socialism," and "liberty rights and social rights," then taking
the side of the latter in each pairing. Id. Continuing:
The dissent characterizes the position of unconstitutionality, namely that of
allowing extracurricular lessons in principle, as siding with the former group
and the position of constitutionality, namely that of banning extracurricular
lessons, as siding with the latter. In view of the principle of free democracy, the
basic order of our country, such theory has a logical leap [sic] or is an opinion of
bigotry.
Id.
369. Id. (Lee, J., dissenting). This is apparently in contrast to "the deep national
belief' in the United States that "individual merit and responsibility" should matter
more than, say, race. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978)).
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370
is "the whole thing, the whole ball game," perhaps "life itself.
Status consciousness, as well as distinctions and divisions based on
one's status, is part of the Korean "social DNA. ' 371 It is ordinary and
obvious in every aspect of Korean life and in every institution of
Korean society-family, education, religion, politics, marriage. Yet the
Court pretends that its decision has no implications on social status,
and seems little concerned with another explicit right provided for in
the Korean Constitution-the right to be equal before the law,
regardless of one's social status.

The Court did a disservice to another Constitutional mandate, that
"[a]ll citizens shall have an equal right to receive an education
corresponding to their abilities."372 If elaboration of "abilities" (neungnyuk 373) is necessary, one would think "individual merit" would better
define it than "social status." With its decision, the Court has
essentially ruled that social status is included in one's "abilities," a
dangerous view that allows for credentializing high(er) social status.
Or the Court has essentially crafted a right of education that
supersedes the right of equality. Either way, the Court dilutes the
meaning of equality.
There is a consistency of discomfiture here. We are told that the
principle of equality before the law is "the most paramount principle"
of our Constitution, 374 and that the right of equality is "the most
fundamental" of all fundamental rights. 375 This equality is regardless
of one's social status, one would think. 3 76 Yet it is "relative equality"
(versus absolute equality) to which people are entitled, 3 77 and notions
of relative equality lead to results like the one in the private
instruction case. Perhaps we in Korea demand equality when equality

370.

Author Salman Rushdie used the phrasing to describe free speech. Salman

Rushdie, What Is My Single Life Worth?, in THE PENGUIN BOOK OF TWENTIETHCENTURY SPEECHES 478, 487 (Brian MacArthur ed., 1992).

371.

Richard Delgado & Daniel Farber, Is American Law Inherently Racist?, 15

T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 361, 364 (1998) (transcript of comments of Professors Delgado
and Farber, wherein Professor Delgado described racism as part of American "social
DNA').
S. KOREA CONST. art. 31(1) (emphasis added).
372.
373.
The Korean neung-nyuk is defined as "ability; capacity; capability; faculty;
competency; qualification." MINJUNG ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra

note 94, at 437. The Korean neung is taken from the Chinese character meaning "able,
may, can; ability, talent, power"; nyuk is from the character meaning "strength, power."
GRANT, supra note 224, at 29, 169.
It is not an uncommon practice in the Korean vernacular to refer to the
374.
first person plural to refer to things Korean. For example: "our country" (ooh-ri-nahrah) for Korea, and "our language" (ooh-ri-mahl)for Korean.
KWON, supra note 192, at 368 n.1 (citing 88 Hun-Hah 7, Jan. 25, 1989
375.
(Korea Sup. Ct.)).
376.

S. KOREA CONST. art. 11(1).

377.
KWON, supra note 192, at 369. This statement also appears in an
explanation of Article 11 on the Internet site of the Korean National Assembly.

Constitution of the Republic of Korea, § 2, art. 11, joh-moon-byul-sul-myung joh-moonbyul-sul-myung, at http://www3.assembly.go.kr/alkms/cgi-bin/counter.cgi?lawscode=lO01.
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suits us. 3 78 Does the rule of "relative equality" or "equality
corresponding to ... abilities" take us back to the Chosun dynasty and
the days of the yangban and the lower classes? Even the mainstream
commentary acknowledges the possibility of the hahk-buhl class
society being a modern day social aristocracy that originated in the
traditional era. 3 7 9 This social structure reflects a separate equality, or
an administrative equality, in an ordered society for which Korea
38 0
continues to be world-renowned.

C. Critical Status Denied?
What is the likelihood of a critical status movement taking root
in Korea, one that would advance the theory that for all of the
equality professed in Korean law and policy, Korea remains a society
with a keen sense of status consciousness, with legally sanctioned
division among members of society based on social status? As the
discussion above indicates, using two major themes seen in critical
race theory as a guide, the Korean setting provides the necessary
foundation for such critical thought. Perhaps there are scholars in the
Korean legal academy to advance this cause, perhaps there are not.

38 1

Only time will tell.

378.
It has been said that U.S. civil rights law benefits whites more than blacks.
See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
63-64 (1989). In this fictional narrative, one states:
Although [the Fourteenth Amendment] was enacted to give blacks the rights of
citizens, for most of its early history it was utilized as Professor Bittker put it
so well, to nurture 'railroads, utility companies, banks, employers of child labor,
chain stores, money lenders, aliens, and a host of other groups and
institutions.'
Id. In Korea too, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court reveals that not all who
prevail on claims of discrimination based on social status are those without college
degrees working in manual labor. E.g., 90 Hun-Mah 28, Mar. 11, 1991 (declaring
unconstitutional election law barring leaders of certain trade organizations from
holding public office, on ground that law discriminated on account of social status of
plaintiffs' occupational position), discussedin Lee, supra note 142, at 361.
379.
See Lee, supra note 142, at 364 n.46. Professor Lee refers to a media
column in which the author is quite blunt in assessing that Korea, far from a
"democratic republic," has become a "state of social aristocracy." Seh-Hwa Song, Sahhwe-gwi-jok-eui nah-rah [A Social AristocracyNation], HAN-GYU-REH, Aug. 25, 2002, at
http://www.hani.co.kr/section-001012000/2002/08/001012000200208251819238.html.
The columnist urges that social aristocracy exists in all the institutions of
contemporary Korean society, including politics, business, economy, education, legal
profession, media, and religion. Id.
380. The reader will note that some of the predicted rhetoric of the critical
status theorist resembles what "conservative" scholars in the United States have
charged against a "liberal" Supreme Court.
381.
Similarly, this Article suggests that a framework is in place for a Korean
feminist legal jurisprudence, based on the U.S. equivalent. The Korean Constitution
prohibits discrimination based on sex, S. KOREA CONST. art. 11(1), yet Korea "remains
overwhelmingly a man's world. Aside from Islamic countries, it has fewer female

2004]

SOCIAL STA TUS AND KOREAN LAW

Submitted for discussion herein are considerations that make
the beginnings of a critical status theory movement questionable, at
least in the near future. First, since critical status theory would be
seen as controversial and unconventional as critical race theory has
been stateside, 38 2 Korean scholars contemplating such scholarship
(especially junior scholars), would likely be discouraged from doing
so. 38 3 There is the question of the extent to which the great pressure
and demand for conformity seen in Korean society generally is also
present in the Korean legal academy. 38 4 If it is true that "Koreans...
say of their society that 'the nail that sticks out gets hammered
down,"' does the Korean tendency to "swing the hammer harder and
more often than just about any other people in the world" 38 5 apply to
the academic setting? One hopes that academic freedom knows no
national boundaries and that even in a society where "any difference
38 6
from others is easily regarded as deviance rather than creativity"
that scholarship ought by definition encourage the opportunity to
38 7
present differential academic theories regarding law and society.
Moreover, to the extent that critical status theory adopts for its
scholarship the still controversial writing form (chiefly, the

politicians and business executives and prominent figures than almost any other
nation in the world." Nicholas D. Kristof, Seoul Journal:In Sexist South Korea, the
Girls Even the Score, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1996, at 4.
382.
See supra text accompanying note 274. Judge Posner declines to pull
punches regarding his views on the movement and its members: "Their lodgment in the
law schools is a disgrace to legal education, which lacks the moral courage and the
intellectual self-confidence to pronounce a minority movement's scholarship bunk."
Posner, supra note 274, at 43.
383.
See Alfred C. Yen, Foreword: Making Us Possible, 4 ASIAN L.J. 1, 3 (1997)
(noting hostility that discourages young faculty from pursuing race conscious
scholarship). A contrasting view would remind that in many Korean universities,
entry-level faculty appointments come with tenure virtually assured, and thus, junior
scholars could pursue whatever scholarship they choose without fear of reprisal.
384.
See Yang & Rosenblatt, supra note 70, at 364 ("Koreans [are] expected to
conform in many situations."); Daniel Y. Jun, Note, Bribery Among the Korean Elite:
Putting an End to a Cultural Ritual and Restoring Honor, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1071, 1077 (1996) (discussing "conformist views oriented towards the collective group");
Kwang Soo Ma, Wanted: Democracy of the Mind, South Korean Society Hasn't Shaken
off Its AuthoritarianStreak, TIME, Apr. 3, 2002, at 21 (noting "ascetic, feudal values
that hold non-conformity in contempt"); Barry Renfrew, Poet Called Obscene For NonConformist Values, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 9, 1987, at 1987 WL 3151130 (describing
demand for conformity as "suffocating").
385.
CLIFFORD, supra note 30, at 10.
386.
Yang & Rosenblatt, supra note 70, at 369. Yang and Rosenblatt note that in
addition to the expectation of conformity, "Koreans ... are drawn by other Koreans
into blaming those who deviate. In that blaming, one will usually agree publicly, even
if one feels like disagreeing." Id. at 364 (citing Yoon, supra note 35). The authors
suggest a theoretical linkage between shame and conformity and status. Id. at 373.
387.
Indeed, the recent years have seen the beginnings of two legal journals
addressing progressive themes relating to law, society and democratic politics: Bubgwa sah-hwe (Law and Society), and Min-ju bub-hahk (DemocraticLegal Studies).
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"storytelling" form of discussion) seen in critical race scholarship, 388
the movement is practically doomed. Many critical race theorists
decline the "impersonal voice" seen in dominant discourse of
traditional civil rights scholarship, which adopts "white cultural
patterns" as "a baseline norm."38 9 They favor instead a "more
subjective, personal voice" 390 in "the material, aesthetic, emotional,
and spiritual experiences of people of color."'3 91 Thus, in discussing
race, racism, and law, critical race theorists often resort to the
storytelling form-"autobiographies, self-portraits, allegories, fables,
and fictive narratives. 3 92 Although some mainstream scholars have
been sharply critical of the use of the (often uncorroborated) firstperson narrative complaining of discrimination, disgust, and
despair, 393 critical race authors continue to defend the practice:
"Autobiographical stories within legal discourse expose how the forces
of domination are experienced at the individual level; how they are
perceived from a given perspective, and how they make one feel. 394
Consider the following first-person account of Korean-American
Professor Robert Chang, a leader in the Asian-American legal
jurisprudence movement:
Of the different voices in which I speak, I have been most comfortable
with the one called silence. Silence allowed me to escape notice when I
was a child. I could become invisible, and hence safe. Yet now I find
myself leaving the safety of my silence.
....
I think about the American border guard who stopped me when
I tried to return to the United States after a brief visit to Canada. My
valid Ohio driver's license was not good enough to let me return to my
country. He asked me where my passport was. I told him that I did not
have one and that it was my understanding that I did not need one,
that a driver's license was sufficient. He told me that a driver's license
is not proof of citizenship. We were at an impasse. I asked him what

388.
See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Book Review, 5 CONST. COMM. 436, 437, 448
(1988) (reviewing BELL, supra note 378) (describing fictional narrative as "a whining
litany of arrant and pernicious nonsense written in a childish prose," "a piece of
mindless left-wing ranting," "wails of embittered, hate-filled self-pity").
389.
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS, supra note 270, at 314.
390.
DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT
PROTESTER 171 n.10 (1994).

Id. See also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 269, at 462-63 (noting that
391.
critical race theory scholarship counters and challenges "power-laden beliefs" with
"counterstories, parables, chronicles, and anecdotes"); Montoya, supra note 329, at 244
(noting that narrative form "subverts the dominant discourse," "displace[s]
conventional wisdom and disrupt[s] official histories").
392.
Montoya, supra note 329, at 244.
393.
See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 274, at 96-97 (challenging accuracy and
typicality of first-person accounts); see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry,
Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 833
(1993) (same); Anne Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in
Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1270 (1995) (urging that first-person
accounts be verifiable).
Montoya, supra note 329, at 244.
394.
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was going to happen. He said that he might have to detain me. I
looked away. I imagined the phone call that I would have to make, the
embarrassment I would feel as I told my law firm in Seattle that I
would not be at work the next day, or maybe even the day after
that....
.... [There was also] the time I was driving in the South and was
refused service at a service station. [And] the time I was stopped in
New Jersey for suspicion of possessing a stolen vehicle. At first, it was
just two cops. Then another squad car came. Four big (white)
policemen for one small (Asian) man, in a deserted parking lot-no
witnesses if it came to that. Perhaps they were afraid that I might
know martial arts, which I do, but I am careful never to let them know.
When my license and registration checked out, they handed back my
papers and left without a word. They could not even say that one word,
"Sorry," which would have allowed me to leave that incident behind. I
might have forgotten it as a mistake, one of those unpleasant things
that happen. Instead, I have to carry it with me because of the anger I
feel, and because of the fear-fear of the power that certain people are
able to exercise over me because of this (contingent) feature that makes
me different. No matter how hard I scrub, it does not come clean. No
matter how hard I try, and I do try, I can never be as good as everyone
else. I can never be white.
....I am tired of silence. And so, I raise my voice.

395

Chang is one of several critical race theorists who has relied on
the personal narrative form in critical race scholarship. The question
for critical status theory is whether a Korean law faculty member
would resort to this contextualized discourse based on personal
narrative and experience,3 96 over conventional, doctrinal scholarship,
in order to advance the movement. Such discourse would begin with,
for example, the revelation of a professor's status as a descendant of
generations of the lower or lowest classes in traditional Korea, or of
parents who completed only secondary schooling. It would then be
followed by a recounting of experiences of societal oppression,
discrimination, and prejudice to which he and his family were
subjected as a result of their social status. The likelihood of such
disclosure and discussion requires consideration of multiple factors.
First, if indeed there is a correlation between one's educational
achievement and family's social status, 39 7 there are not likely to be
many in number who emerge from the bottom of the social structure,
against tremendous odds, to rise to a university professorship.
Second, as Professor Fujiya Kawashima, a scholar of yangban Korea
has observed, "Today all Koreans identify themselves with the
lineages of yangban scholar-officials. .

.

. I have met many Koreans

who could identify famous scholar-official ancestors, but I do not

395.
Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical
Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1244
(1993).
396.
See Delgado, supra note 265, at 745.
397.
See supra text accompanying notes 210-13, 336-37.
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recall meeting a Korean who could trace descent to a slave in the
'398
Choson dynasty.
Similarly, the literature on Korean behavioral norms includes
the observation by Professors Seungeun Yang and Paul Rosenblatt
that Koreans want to hide a family past that includes "low status or
poverty." 399 If such statements are a fair reflection of the modal
tendency in Korean society, as well as the segment of the population
that comprises law faculty specifically, one wonders about the
likelihood of a university professor, "the historical successor to the
scholar of the Choson dynasty" and one of the most prestigious of
occupations in contemporary Korea, 40 0 venturing beyond the modal
area. The belief that disclosure of prior low status and experiences
with social prejudice entails risk of tainting a most cherished status
would ultimately act as a prior restraint of such disclosure. 40 1 If this
is the case, then status consciousness and the obsession with the
pursuit and preservation of social status would show their powerful
force, affecting the politics of scholarship and effectively preventing a
critical status theory in Korean law from beginning. Under these
conditions, the "willingness to search for truth ... [that] is central to
democracy" 40 2 and that is a purpose of scholarship would have to rely

398.
Kawashima, supra note 246, at 15. This presents one difference between
racial and status identification in the United States and Korea, respectively. Although
persons of racial groups in the United States may express pride in their heritage and
continue to identify with their ancestral origins, Koreans of non-yangban classes are
not likely to do so.
399.
Yang & Rosenblatt, supra note 70, at 364. 'Many middle class Americans
may brag about how they or their parents or grandparents came up from poverty, but
middle class Koreans would rather not talk about it." Id.
400.
See LETT, supra note 17, at 46.
401.
It should be noted that the current president of Korea, Moo-Hyun Roh,
came from a family with limited means. His parents could not afford to send him to
college. Even without a college education, he successfully passed the grueling bar
examination and became a judge and a human rights lawyer. K. Connie Kang, Los
Angeles Koreans in L.A. Give Roh's Win Mixed Reviews, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at
B3. In addition, the late Ju Yung Chung, the founder and chairman of Hyundai, a
major Korean conglomerate, also acknowledged humble origins in what is now North
Korea. See DONALD KIRK, KOREAN DYNASTY: HYUNDAI AND CHUNG JU YUNG 21-23
(1994); see also RICHARD M. STEERS, MADE IN KOREA: CHUNG JU YUNG AND THE RISE OF
HYUNDAI 28-35 (1999). Perhaps those in such elevated positions, far removed from the
upper middle class, are less likely to conceal their prior lower status.
Also of interest in this discussion is the disclosure of Ku Kim, a leader in the
Korean independence movement during the years of Japanese colonial rule, and a key
figure in modern Korean history. Kim had disclosed in an autobiography that his
ancestors enjoyed high status until one was executed for a crime, early in the Chosun
dynasty. The remaining family members fled, performed ordinary labor, and held out
as commoners. They were "mistreated by neighbors" and were regarded "as below
commoner status." HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 391 n.23, 397 n.67. Henderson notes:
"Such an admission borders on the outside limits of Korean frankness on the subject."
Id. at 397 n.67 (emphasis added).
402.
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 274, at 107. "Jil-li-reul ahl-ji-ni jil-li-gah
nuh-heui-reul jah-yu-keh hah-ri-rah." Yo-han bok-eum [John] 8:32 ("And ye shall know
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on more conventional methods of discourse. In contrast, if the
sentiments of Kawashima, Yang and Rosenblatt border on stereotype
and do not fairly account for the possibility of individual differences,
then the likelihood of Korean law professors recounting such personal
40 3
histories in their texts is, without further data, uncertain at best.
In all events, interested observers await the inclinations of the
Korean legal academy.

V. CONCLUSION

Social status arguably defines the individual in Korean society;
the pursuit of status defines the country as a whole. This
contemporary status consciousness is deeply rooted, with origins in
the centuries of traditional Confucian society that had formal, rigid
class distinctions. At a minimum, this Article calls attention to the
divisions within a society that has commonly been described as
homegeneous, and the Korean legal system's recognition of such
divisions. Moreover, even acknowledging the differences between
social status in Korea and race in the United States, this Article
advances the question of whether the two may be considered in
equivalence, in several important respects. Principally, for centuries
and still today, social status in Korea and race in the United States
divide persons of the respective society. There are also ready
parallels between race and law stateside and social status and law in
Korea. Within ten years of each other, Korea adopted a new
Constitution that explicitly abolished a social aristocracy and
prohibited discrimination based on social status (1948), and the U.S.

the truth, and the truth shall make you free."). See also id. 8:45 ("And because I tell
you the truth, ye believe me not.")
403.
Would Koreans in the United States be up for the task, where status
consciousness exists, but is less acute? More specifically, would second and third
generation immigrants from Korea, the children of dry cleaner and grocery store
owners who succeeded academically, graduating from Ivy League colleges and winning
law faculty appointments, be willing to step forward to narrate their experiences of
bias and prejudice within Korean communities in the United States or on return visits
to Korea? Would such Koreans be less inclined to be discouraged from disclosing their
families' earlier status? Were this to occur, the movement would be more of a Korean
American critical status theory rather than a Korean critical status theory. Not all
Koreans of the world are considered Korean by Koreans in the motherland. Cf.
Diversity Goes Global, MINORITY L.J., Summer 2003, at 57, 58 (reporting that Korean
business clients look down on second and third generation Korean American lawyers:
"The clients didn't view the Korean American lawyers as really being Korean
anymore."); SAMSUNG PRESS FOUNDATION, A STUDY OF KOREAN AND AMERICAN
NEWSPAPER EDITORS' PERCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES, KOREA, AND NORTH KOREA
19 (1998), discussed in Jeh-mi-dong-po Image Boo-jung-juhk [Negative Image of Korean
Americans], HAN-KUK ILBO [KOREA TIMES] (Chicago edition), June 26, 1999, § 2, at 1
(reporting survey that showed 44.4 percent of respondents had negative image of
Koreans in United States, 30 percent positive image, and 25.6 percent neutral image).
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Supreme Court demanded integration in public primary schools,
calling for an end to the separate but equal doctrine (1954). In both
countries, these moments can be seen as reflecting the enlightened
view that whatever distinctions society may make based on social
status or race, law ought not allow the government to impose burdens
or dispense benefits based on such distinctions. Two decades later,
U.S. critical race theorists began to question whether civil rights law
effects the equality that the law of the land guarantees or merely
maintains the status quo of inequality between the races. A similar
question could be advanced in the Korean setting, namely, whether
the legal system actually provides the equality that the Korean
Constitution demands, or whether the legal institution, like the rest
of society, is merely a part of the national make-up that encourages
and continues division based on social status. The Korean critical
theorist would likely raise as a concern the still developing state of
legal consciousness in Korea and the uncertain impact of the rule of
law.
The equal protection provision in the Korean Constitution that
declares that all citizens are equal before the law and that prohibits
discrimination based on social status may well be a mere a transplant
of the rule that the U.S. military had imposed on Korea's neighbor
across the East Sea. 40 4 Or, less likely, the provision could be a true
reflection of the Korean sense of individual equality in the 1940s
when the Constitution was adopted. The point is largely a matter of
historical interest. The reality is that the Korean Constitution has
adopted the language of equality regardless of social status from the
very beginning of the republic and has retained it at every juncture.
It is a matter of contemporary Korean law. The meaning given to the
formalistic right of equality and against discrimination depends, of
course, on political and societal conditions, and Korea has seen
changes in that regard in recent decades. The democratization
movement that began in the late 1980s has led to the more frequent
use of terms such as "equality." At the same time (and somewhat
ironically, when anti-U.S. sentiment has been growing), Korean
commentators have noted the positive influence of U.S.
constitutionalism on Korean jurisprudence. 40 5 Indeed, the Korean
judiciary may benefit from the more developed rules of U.S. law and
the experience of a federal judiciary with over two centuries of

404.
This body of water is known as the Sea of Japan to the rest of the world.
405.
See generally Kim & Lee, supra note 21. The commentary includes
revisionist interpretations of the Korean Constitution to the effect that the document
was inspired by principles of U.S. constitutional law. Id. at 303, 304 (noting that "the
influence of the U.S. Government on the [Korean] Constitution was notable" and
"USAMGIK contributed to the introduction of basic concepts of American constitutional
law"). But see MACDONALD, supra note 139, at 150 (noting that Korean Constitution
"was prepared with little or no American advice").
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judicial review. 40 6 However, the careful observer in Korea will note
that U.S. equal protection law has not been unassailable from all
quarters, and that it too has been targeted as a source of inequality in
U.S. society.
This Article, which encourages discussion of the equivalence of
race and social status and the possible extension of a critical theory
movement to Korea, invites new discourse in both Korean and U.S.
legal thought. In the Korean setting, policy makers must continue the
dialogue on what aspects of U.S. law and legal system Korea wishes
to adopt and adapt for implementation in Korea, and why. In
addition, the notion of a critical status theory may lead legal
commentators to offer Confucianism as the major cause of the acute
status consciousness that is present in contemporary Korean society,
joining the list of modern conditions for which Confucianism has been
blamed. 40 7 Across the Pacific, this Article could trigger new comment
on the now established, but also much maligned, critical race theory
thought in the U.S. legal academy. Some will note weaknesses in the
critical race approach when compared with a law and society of
another jurisdiction where even a stronger case for critical theory can
be made. Others will note the universality of the basic tenets of
critical race-the challenge against liberalism and the dominant
discourse, and the search for equality with dignity-and encourage
efforts to apply them in the international setting, 40 8 perhaps in the
form of nation case studies. In any event, using race and law in the
U.S. setting as a model will allow for better understanding of the
relationship between social status and law in Korea. Those more
familiar with the Korean model could employ the reverse method.
This Article also encourages further examination of Korean law
in the context of its social norms and a history both remarkable and
turbulent. In the opening years of a new millennium, Korea seeks a
significant role on the international stage. At the same time, this
nation where constitutionalism, democracy, and equality are
relatively new concepts must continue to address what role law will
play in its domestic (as well as international) affairs. The good news
is that Korean law, like Korean society, is in a state of

406.
Korean constitutionalism is not as developed as that of the United States,
and is still in its early stages. Korea has had a constitution for just over five decades,
and a constitutional democracy only since 1987, exactly two hundred years after the
United States adopted its constitution. See Kim & Lee, supra note 21, at 303, 322.
407.
See generally Cho, supra note 64.
408.
There is precedent. One law journal held a symposium on critical race
theory and international law. Symposium, CriticalRace Theory and InternationalLaw:
Convergence and Divergence, 45 VILL. L. REV. 827-1220 (2000). Also of interest is a
panel discussion sponsored by the American Society of International Law.
International Dimension of Critical Race Theory, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 408
(1997).
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transformation, 40 9 thus leaving open the possibility of reform. How
much reform Korea will adopt and in what time will say much about
this culture.

409.
See RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 2;
see also Ahn, supra note 3, at 115. See generally Kim & Lee, supra note 21. Korean law
in transformation was a theme of the conference on Korean law held at Illinois. See
supra note 2.

